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Presenting ‘The Russia Workshop’
A New Insight on Contemporary Russia
Giancarlo Bosetti, ResetDoc
Since its foundation in 2005, Reset DoC has promoted dia-
logue across cultural divides through seminars, conferences, 
publications, and international events. In more than ten years 
of activities, we managed to develop a network among intellec-
tuals with different cultural, religious, political backgrounds all 
around the Mediterranean, the American and Asian regions. 
In this era of conflicts and tensions, Reset DoC has been able 
to promote the exchange of ideas even concerning the former 
Soviet Union context and its main actor, Russia, above all.
In order to bridge the gap of knowledge, we gathered, un-
der the coordination of the Italian historian Andrea Graziosi, 
some of the foremost international scholars and world experts 
on Russian studies. The first international workshop – entitled 
The Evolution of Russian Political Thought After 1991 – was 
held in Berlin at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige 
Politik (DGAP) on June 22-23, 2015. It represented the start 
point of a long-term initiative that Reset DoC promoted in or-
der to facilitate the exchange of ideas and views between Rus-
sian and international experts in the field of the Russian stud-
ies: The Russia Workshop project.
This Berliner episode was the initial stage in a much longer 
journey and its core significance was in the fact that it unlocked 
a number of subsequent events, such as the concomitant round-
table entitled ‘The Political Culture of Today’s Russia. The Power 
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State Is Back?’ that was held at DGAP on June 25, 2015. This 
meeting constituted a separate event from the first one, offering 
the direct testimony of some prominent European policy mak-
ers in approaching Russia’s power policy issues. After the Berlin 
events, the Russia Workshop initiative had further accredita-
tions, attracting the attention of additional partners and spon-
sors and the participation of prestigious research institutes.
The second workshop entitled Locating ‘Conservative Ide-
ology’ in Today’s Russia was organized in collaboration with the 
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) 
at George Washington University) on March 31 – April 1, 2016. 
This event focused on ‘conservatism’ – as one of the main ele-
ments in the Kremlin’s political languages – and those conser- 
vative values and connotations that define contemporary Rus-
sia. In this event, the debate analyzed the diversity and plurality 
within the Russian ‘conservative’ spectrum, its representatives 
in literature, art, social life and in the Orthodox Church, its 
geopolitical-ideological dimension (as Eurasianism), its Statist 
approach and its vision of the world order.
The third event entitled The State and Political Discourse in 
Today’s Russia will be held in Venice at the Fondazione Gior-
gio Cini on June 17-18, 2016. It will focus on the multiplicity of 
the Russian state political discourses within its various organs, 
administration, media and party, so as to analyze those con-
cepts and ‘sacred’ ideological references which are promoted 
by Moscow. The debate will also consider the demise of liber-
alism and its pluralistic approach, bearing in mind the impact 
of the Soviet legacy, the expectation and influence of perestroi-
ka and the future of democracy in Russia.
For 2017, Reset DoC is also scheduling a fourth event in 
Moscow that will concentrate on Russian liberalism. This oc-
casion could further develop the Russia Workshop initiative, 
creating another opportunity to promote dialogue and to ex-
tend the horizon of the debate on Russian studies. The growing 
participation in these events gives us great hope for the future 
of such events. However, only the ability to keep this dynamic 
format, to include more international scholars to the debate, 
to also involve Russian partners in the dialogue and to gener-
ate original insights on contemporary Russia, beyond common 
simplifications and prejudices, would define the success of 
such an ambitious project. This is our challenge.
The first Berlin conference, June 22-23, 2015
Beyond Andrea Graziosi (ANVUR, University of Naples Federico II) and Gian- 
carlo Bosetti, as director or Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations, the scientific 
committee was composed of Timothy J. Colton (Davis Center), Stephen E. 
Hanson (Reves Center), Mark Kramer (Cold War Studies and Davis Center), 
Matthew Rojansky (Kennan Institute), Alexandra Vacroux (Davis Center), 
Vladislav M. Zubok (London School of Economics). The Reset-DoC organi- 
zation team was composed of: Giancarlo Bosetti (Director), Letizia Durante 
(Project Administrator), Michele Salonia (Project Manager), Elisa Gianni 
(Project Assistant) and Nicola Missaglia (Reset-DoC Managing Editor) with 
the collaboration of Riccardo Mario Cucciolla (IMT Lucca) and Yulia Loe-
va (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik). In addition to the authors 
published in this book, also Vladislav Inozemtsev and Sergey Markedonov in-
tervened as speakers and Andrea Graziosi and Vladislav Zubok as discussants. 
The event and this publication were made possible thanks to the support of 
the Nomis Foundation and of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. See the 
official page: http://www.resetdoc.org/news/00000000153.
The Berlin roundtable, June 25, 2015
The roundtable was welcomed by Arend Oetker (President of the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) and chaired by Giancarlo Bosetti (Reset DoC) 
with the participation of Giuliano Amato (former Italian Prime Minister and 
now Judge of the Italian Constitutional Court), Toomas Hendrik Ilves (President 
of the Republic of Estonia), Jörg Lau (Foreign Editor Die Zeit), Manuel Sarrazin 
(Member of the German Bundestag), Karel von Schwarzenberg (former Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic), Marlene Laruelle (George Wash-
ington University). See: http://www.resetdoc.org/issue/04/01/2016.
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The Washington conference, March 31 – April 1, 2016
The event was directed by Marlene Laruelle and the scientific committee was 
composed of Alexey Barabashev (Higher School of Economics, Moscow); Gian-
carlo Bosetti, Timothy J. Colton, Andrea Graziosi, Stephen E. Hanson, Mark 
Kramer, Andrei Melville (Higher School of Economics, Moscow), Matthew 
Rojansky, Alexandra Vacroux, Vladislav M. Zubok. The partner institutions 
involved were: the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies 
(IERES), George Washington University; the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Aus-
wärtige Politik, Berlin; the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 
Harvard University; the Cold War Studies Program, Harvard University; the 
Kennan Institute for Advanced Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars; the London School of Economics; the Wendy and Emery 
Reves Center for International Studies, College of William and Mary; National 
Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow. For the detailed 
program see: http://www.resetdoc.org/news/00000000160
Preface
The Importance of Understanding 
Contemporary Russia
Riccardo Mario Cucciolla, IMT Lucca
The 2014 Ukrainian crisis was one of the gravest geopolitical 
earthquakes in Europe since 1991 and it is still manifesting its 
aftershocks in international relations presenting the harder 
side of the post-Cold war Russia. The proactive policy of Pu-
tin’s last mandate is emblematic of the recomposition of a Mos-
cow-dominated political space and of a return of the ‘power 
state’ in Europe, reproducing dynamics that had been typical 
of the last century in the old continent. Actually, a quarter cen-
tury after the Soviet collapse, under the influence of different 
traditions, factors, events, and interests, Russia seems to have 
developed a new version of the ‘power state’ that dominated 
European history until the 20th century’s tragedies.
The Kremlin’s power politics – based on rearmament and 
force policies – has been frequently associated with the Wil-
helmine Machtpolitik; the arrogance, arbitrariness and territo-
rial claims of its programs have been condemned as a revival of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop spirit and a denial of the of Helsinki 
1975 achievements; the tacit acceptance of the dismemberment 
of a part of the Ukrainian state reminded the events of the 1938 
Munich Conference, meanwhile the reference to nationalist 
values, often contradictory, seemed to recall some thankfully 
outdated ideologies. These elements are symptomatic of an 
internal transformation of Russia for which the West was un-
prepared. In fact, the situation that was exacerbated in spring 
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2014 – when the circumstances became so dire that many ana-
lysts overstated that Europe had to be prepared to fight a ‘new 
world war’ on its territory – clearly indicated a key fact: The 
West had underestimated Russia’s potential for years.
This unpreparedness demonstrated an overall lack of 
awareness about a country that – although present in the Euro-
pean spatial dimension – still seemed unknown and unfamiliar 
in many aspects. The cause of this situation is due to a gen-
eral unwillingness of the Western chancelleries and media to 
deal with the Russian – and the former Soviet – world after the 
USSR collapse. Let us try to understand the crucial points that 
led to this situation.
1991 turned out to be a pivotal year that defined the conclu-
sion of the Cold War, the collapse of communism and the begin-
ning of a new season of uncertainty. The Soviet Union, which for 
nearly 70 years had been a decisive geopolitical actor and an ide-
ological, political and military ‘alternative’ to the democratic and 
capitalist world, vanished. In his resignation speech, the Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev claimed to have done everything 
possible to save the integrity of the state and recalled the impor-
tance of those reforms that were carried out during perestroika, 
wishing the Russian people a future leading “towards a pros-
perous and democratic society.” Despite the inevitable doubts 
about the perspectives of the independent RSFSR, the expira-
tion of the USSR was met with enthusiasm in Russia and by the 
international community that was hoping for a historic turning 
point. However, the 90s represented a season of disillusioned 
promises of prosperity and drove Russia into a decade of dark-
ness. In fact, this period was characterized by a dramatic chain 
of events – due to the radical reform of the former Soviet system 
– that inexorably marked the Russian destiny and brought about 
a decline in living standards.
At the political level, the 90s represented a period of harsh 
struggle – emphasized by strong opposition to reforms, the vi-
olent centrifugal pressures and the phenomena of separatism, 
the war in Chechnya, the assertion of the oligarchies and wide-
spread crime – that had its culmination in the constitutional 
crisis of autumn 1993. As a result, the process of democratiza-
tion in Russia was seriously distorted.
At an economic level, the ‘shock therapy’ recipe did not 
meet the desired results, degenerating into another emergency 
situation – exasperated by hyperinflation, pulverization of in-
comes, rising unemployment and poverty rates – with the fall 
of the demographic and social indicators. This general decline 
matured into further despair for an already exasperated popu-
lation that had lost hope in the future. Substantially, the enthu-
siasm for the “wind of change” was over, meanwhile Western 
politics was unable to seize that historical conjuncture, there-
after ceasing to take interest in a country that was no longer a 
strategic issue. Russia, in turn, felt the humiliation and frustra-
tion of no longer being a determinant ‘Great power’ on the in-
ternational stage, and the desire for revenge would be a decisive 
factor in the Russian political scenario. The ‘Russian redemp-
tion’ became a key issue legitimizing the rise of Putin and his 
program which promised to return Russia to a commanding 
and powerful position. This program was further implemented 
in the second half of the 2000’s when improving economic con-
ditions – with high oil and gas prices – allowed the reaffirmation 
of the ‘Russian bear’ as an actor on the geopolitical stage, no 
longer condemned to helplessly observe events unfold. Once 
again, the West had underestimated the circumstances.
There are a number of reasons which explain the Western 
disengagement from Russia: due to the conclusion of the Cold 
War and the collapse of the Soviet system, the new giant state 
appeared – to Westerners – as a country that had been ‘defeated 
by history’ and that was inexorably destined to join the West-
ern cause. At that time, Huntington’s “fourth wave” claimed to 
be imminent and the liberal democracy seemed to be destined 
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to triumph everywhere. On the other hand, the West lost the 
‘alternative’ ideological referent which had tied a part of Eu-
ropean intellectuals to the ideas of Moscow. In fact, the Soviet 
collapse broke those ties that were connecting most of the com-
munist parties around the world to Russia, declassifying it to 
a lower rank on the intellectual, economic and political level, 
with the West merely regarding it as a new minor partner that 
was opening its market and supplying hydrocarbons to Europe.
Furthermore, the conclusion of the Cold War and the end 
of the nuclear threat implied that it was no longer convenient 
to concentrate so many political energies on a ‘defeated’ former 
antagonist that, in a sense, seemed to be ‘relegated to history.’ 
Conversely, at the academic level, the study for post-commu-
nist Russia never stopped and has produced a number of excel-
lent works that have carefully analyzed the post-Soviet context. 
However, these studies have also been underestimated – or 
even ignored – by politics until 2014, when it became evident 
the analytical naïveté of many Western decision-makers who 
had previously underrated – or ingenuously interpreted – the 
political steps pursued by Russia over the last twenty-five years.
In fact, in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation, Russia 
– in all its idiosyncrasies and contradictions – appeared as a 
colossal and enigmatic neighbor that wanted to assert its power 
status and with which the West had failed to create a lasting 
and comprehensive dialogue and a long-term strategy to face 
the post-bipolar world order. This low awareness of the Rus-
sian context has involved relevant risks on the intellectual level 
as well as for the decision-making actors, which become in-
creasingly clear in the course of the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, 
in this situation of tensions and misunderstandings between 
Moscow and the West, it emerged as a necessity to bridge this 
gap and to restore a dialogue based on understanding and 
awareness of the interlocutor through a deeper study of it: a 
new comprehensive strategy that could start from the experts’ 
and the academic worlds in order to go over the simplifications 
and prejudices that too often are the cause – and at the same 
time the result – of ignorance. The need to understand what 
was happening in the largest – and resource-richest – country 
in the world became a political priority again in order to not 
be unprepared when faced with the Kremlin’s ‘irruptive meas-
ures’ and for understanding, predicting, and – if possible – 
containing its aggressive attitudes.
The main step that would enable us to better understand 
contemporary Russia and its attitude ambition to reaffirm do-
mestically a ‘power state’ and externally a reestablish ‘Great 
Power’ status is in the consideration of the Russian political 
thought and the dynamics that define it. The dynamics being 
the mythologization of the political discourse, the continuous 
search for legitimation of sovereignty, territorial and political 
space dimensions, the patriotic rhetoric, the geopolitics of re-
sources and security culture, the ‘state militarism’ and war nar-
ratives as well as nation state discourse in a ‘multinational em-
pire’ etc. are complementary – and often contradictory – aspects 
of contemporary Russia. Therefore, this varied dimension of Rus-
sian political thought is necessarily interrelated with its domes-
tic and international situation and is functional to the regime’s 
stability. In fact, bearing in mind the need for legitimation of 
Putin’s regime helps us to understand the aggressive attitude 
and contradictions of contemporary Russia, surpassing debat- 
able and simplistic discourses about Putin’s irrationality and the 
Kremlin’s unpredictability. In this scenario, it is possible to see 
that the ‘red lines’ are clearly visible delineating the risks of a 
restyled and uncontrollable ‘New Cold War’ between Moscow 
and the West. In accordance with these premises, it is necessary 
to embark on a new path to understand a reality that is crucial 
in order to create an exchange of ideas between the two worlds. 
For this aim, the international workshop entitled The Evolution 
of Russian Political Thought After 1991 was conceived.
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This first event was entirely dedicated to the political 
thought in post-communist Russia, involving a debate that 
would go beyond the simple study of ideologies and political 
doctrines. In fact, understanding the evolutions of the political 
thought means also to understand the identity of a country, the 
regime legitimizing issues and the direction that its politics as-
sumes in domestic affairs and in international relations as the 
‘re-composition’ of its political space after the Soviet collapse. 
During this first workshop, some crucial dynamics and issues 
emerged, supporting a debate on different directions in order to 
understand what was the significance of the Soviet legacy and of 
the crises of the 1990s in the return of the ‘power state’; what has 
been the influence of political leaders and intellectuals, siloviki, 1 
and economic elites on the current Russian political thought; to 
what extent have external factors – such as NATO enlargement, 
the enlargement of the European Union toward East and the on-
going crisis over Ukraine – contributed to shape this thought; 
what place for minorities and cultural differences does this po-
litical trend leave; and how does the idea of a ‘power state’ influ-
ence Russia’s foreign policy and international relations. This vol-
ume 2 is thus aimed to collect the workshop’s proceedings and to 
stimulate further discussion for ensuing debates.
In his introduction, Timothy J. Colton conceptualizes and 
contextualizes the new actors and variables of contemporary 
Russian political thought. He proceeds by analyzing the atti-
tudinal changes at the individual level, the aggregate dynamics 
– that can be gradual or sudden – and the elements of censor-
ship and self-censorship as fundamental factors. Along these 
lines, Colton provides a methodological framework in which it 
is possible to orientate the debate.
The first part of the volume is dedicated to the imperial 
identity and Soviet heritage in contemporary Russia, focusing 
on the possible continuity patterns with the past. In the first 
chapter, Stephen E. Hanson searches for a continuity link in 
terms of patrimonialism. There, the author analyzes the differ-
ent theories based on cultural continuity, the cynical rational 
choice approach and the idea of virtual politics. Then, he pro-
ceeds with a Weberian examination of patrimonialism in rela-
tion to Putin’s Russia, evidencing its novelties and specificities. 
Therefore, this essay is well correlated with the second chapter 
that studies those political dynamics that contribute to regime 
stability. Hither, Lev Gudkov investigates the “Great power” 
concept as one of the main conditions of Putin’s regime’s le-
gitimacy, evidencing how the consent for the President has 
increased since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This very 
sensitive topic – that touches the Russian nationalist sentiment 
– and the abuse of the “Great power” rhetoric – that is in- 
vested in nostalgia over Soviet communism and for the splendor 
and greatness of the former Russian Empire – creates a sense of 
collective identity in which Russian society finds a ‘safe haven.’
It seems that the West probably underestimated the trauma 
of the Soviet collapse, the violence of socio-economic trans-
formation of the early 1990s, and the feeling of ‘geopolitical 
humiliation’ in segments of Russian society that were longing 
for ‘great power’ long before the Russian regime itself. To un-
derstand this point, it is fundamental to remember that the 
concepts of ‘greatpowerness’ (velikoderzhavnost’) and ‘pater-
nalistic welfare state’ are interrelated in the mind of Russian 
public opinion because ‘great power’ status is perceived as the 
guarantee of socio-political order, and paternalism within. This 
nexus explains why, at least until now, legitimizing support for 
Putin is continuously rising despite an economic crisis.
In the third chapter, Alexei Miller investigates the semantic 
of ‘Nation’ and its relation to the Russian territory. Here, the au-
1 Russian word used for those politicians who were formed in the security or 
military apparatuses.
2  We thank Thomas Moniz for the English revision of some parts of this volume.
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thor evidences the lack of a scientific debate in Russian literature 
and the problems related to the concept of the ‘Nation State’ 
– along its ethnic (russkiy) and civic (rossiyskiy) declinations 
– in a multiethnic state such as the Russian Federation. These 
premises are essential as they make it possible to consider the 
different identity developments that followed the re-establish-
ment of a ‘Russian’ state, and the evolution of other European 
‘nation state’ models whose concept is increasingly questioned.
In the fourth chapter, Marlene Laruelle examines the contra- 
dictions and paradoxes within the ‘xenophobic empire’ be-
tween the Kremlin’s narrative and the Russian population. Ana-
lyzing the Eurasian concepts, she defines the connections with 
the Russian imperial identity dimension, evidencing then the 
difficulties to define the trends of Russia’s relationship with Eu-
rope and with its population, and the space (or even the arena) 
of Russian political thought. In fact, although the Russian pu-
blic opinion overwhelmingly supported the regime’s position 
in the Ukrainian crisis and the Crimean ‘anschluss,’ it presents a 
more plural dimension than is supposed to exist in an authori-
tarian context, revealing a diffused frustration towards the poli- 
tical authority, the state structures, and a pessimistic vision of 
the economic situation.
Russian society continues to be torn by deep contradictions: 
upper and middle classes look westward in their consumeristic 
way of life and shares with large sections of the European pub-
lic opinion a growing xenophobia – and Islamophobia – against 
migrants and minorities. In parallel, the ‘West’ is perceived as a 
geopolitical competitor and, potentially, a military enemy. Fur-
thermore, it is evident that Moscow attempts to find a way to 
recompose the political space it used to dominate and to take 
advantage of the ongoing processes of globalization, in which 
Russia mostly played the role of the ‘looser’ for the past decades. 
Following this corollary, it is palpable how these elements of 
frustration are potential threats to Putin’s stability and they 
risk to re-emerge in the near future, especially if the current the 
socio-economic situation will continue to deteriorate. 
The second part of the volume focuses on the impact that 
war, ethnic conflict and international environment had and 
continue to have on the evolution of Russian political thought. 
In the fifth chapter, Mark Kramer analyzes – through a detailed 
historiographical reconstruction – the meaning of the war con-
cept in post-Soviet Russia, evidencing how war becomes a key 
element in determining Russian politics and political debate. 
Russian wars – internal or external – and the ‘others’ wars’ 
have become fundamental issues for Putin’s regime, revealing 
a genuine link between conflict, political legitimation and the 
enforcement of authoritarianism in Russia. Alexander Golts, in 
the sixth chapter, also finds in militarism a key ideological ele-
ment to interpret contemporary Russia. He evidences its fea-
tures and trends describing the impact of ‘mobilizing politics’ 
on the Russian society and the role of the external elements 
in the political scenario, also placing further questions on fu-
ture developments. Then, Pavel Baev focuses on the interplay 
between the ‘hybrid war’ narrative and the ‘sovereignty-terri-
tory-resources’ discourse in contemporary Russia, evidencing 
how the use of these concepts is indicating a revival of the way 
of the old mindset to control the widespread Russian borders 
and extensive resources. Therein, the author reveals a correla-
tion between sovereignty, territory and natural resources, and 
a reinterpretation of this discourse due to the Artic issues and 
the Ukrainian crisis where the dynamics of the ‘hybrid war’ 
and its risks constitute a dangerous hazard to Moscow.
The last two chapters are finally centered on the other exter-
nal factors of Russian political thought that come directly from 
the system of international relations. Victoria Zhuravleva’s es-
say focuses on the Russian-American relations characterized by 
the dichotomy between the community and the ‘other’ element. 
The narrative mutation, the consequent ‘hostility-building pro-
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cess,’ the demonization of the American ‘other’ and the use of 
such concepts become key elements in Moscow’s search to le-
gitimize its domestic and international policies, interpreting the 
evolution of the Russian political thought in a dialectical per-
spective. Thus, Putin’s moves depend on how he interprets – or 
perhaps misinterprets – what he perceives to be the agenda of 
the West, suggested as a determined and scheming player. In 
fact, Russia mimics the US in many aspects of its foreign policy 
– especially in its soft power agenda – and the United States, as 
the main ‘other’ in the Russian political discourse, becomes a 
model and an antagonist at the same time.
Therefore, ‘power state’ is a central element of Russia’s po-
sition in the international scenario, and the Russian regime pro-
motes Realpolitik denouncing what it perceives as ‘hypocrisy’ of 
the Western world order and its self-styled idealisms. From the 
Russian perspective, the Western domination (as the US one) is 
structural and founded on the dollar-based economy, interna-
tional financial organizations, the information space etc. In res-
ponse, Moscow tries to emerge as a (counter) power offering 
alternatives based on the supremacy of state sovereignty in a 
Westphalian sense – no interference in the name of universalist 
values, no overthrow of regimes, possibility for great powers 
to have their own sphere of influence – and promoting the su-
premacy of the UN General Assembly, the alternative regional 
platforms (as BRICS, SCO and EEU), and a new financial 
order no longer based on the US dollar. This so-called ‘alter-
native world order’ serves directly the Russian regime’s own 
agenda, and it’s meant to guarantee its stability and its power 
upon what Moscow defines as its ‘near abroad.’
In the final essay, Olga Pavlenko examines the Russian ‘secu- 
rity culture’ through a four levels analysis, revealing how every 
dimension in Russian political discourse is tightly intertwined 
with each other. At a sociocultural level, the author marks 
the dichotomy between the prevailing conservative approach 
(Neo-Eurasianism) and the weaker liberal one, discerning their 
similarities and differences. This ambivalence is also influen- 
cing the geopolitical space and the strategic thinking of post- 
Soviet Russia that correlates security, national interests and 
state sovereignty to the perception of external ‘threats and chal- 
lenges.’ These processes are also related to the media level and to 
the military-technical aspect. Therefore, the Kremlin’s foreign 
policy is definitively interrelated with its domestic political 
dimension, and the aggressiveness toward an imaginary ‘West’ 
becomes typical and even characteristic of Putin’s third presi-
dential mandate as a tool of legitimation for his hold on power.
The workshop has thus contributed to the field of Russian 
studies by producing a number of ideas and conclusions that 
will form the solid basis for subsequent discussions. In fact, this 
debate is not going to die with this volume but it must conti- 
nually be fed, teased, confirmed and contradicted. Therefore, 
the main achievement of The Evolution of Russian Political 
Thought After 1991 was to have created a new platform for dia-
logue, comprehension and debate between peoples. Thanks to 
Reset DoC, this format will be upheld for further workshops 
and events that will involve historians, political theorists and 
sociologists – as well as prominent figures in contemporary 
Russian culture – to freely discuss and debate in an open and 
uncensored environment. Berlin – a city that was a symbol of 
division and then of rapprochement between the Western and 
the Eastern blocks – is again an exemplary case of reconciliation.
Introduction
What Do We Mean by ‘Russian Political Thought’?
Timothy J. Colton, Harvard University
I have been asked to make some preliminary comments to 
help frame our forthcoming discussion, and am pleased to have 
this opportunity. The circulated materials already contain a few 
of my ramblings on the subject, as they came out in back-and-
forth conversation with Professor Andrea Graziosi. Consider 
these remarks to be a bit of an elaboration and a provocation, 
and not a very well-focused one.
I have been trained in a scholarly environment where it is 
de rigueur to begin every analytical exercise with a specifica-
tion of the effect the scientist seeks to understand and explain 
(the dependent variable) and the causes he hypothesizes may 
account for that outcome (the independent variables). Our de-
pendent variable here in Berlin is “Russian political thought.” 
‘Thought’ is by definition produced by ‘thinkers.’ The thought 
that incites our interest most is of course, as our organizers re-
mind us, prescriptive and not merely descriptive thought – al-
though the line between the two realms is at times fuzzy.
A famous collection of papers in our field of study which 
many participants in our meeting will know is Russian Think-
ers ,1 by the late Isaiah Berlin. Professor Berlin wrote about in-
tellectuals, mostly as individuals but some of them as part of 
1 Isaiah Berlin, Henry Hardy & Aileen Kelly, Russian Thinkers, Viking Press, 
New York 1978.
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groupings or movements, such as the Populists. The book con-
tains vignettes of philosophers, publicists, novelists, magazine 
editors, political organizers, pamphleteers – Belinsky, Herzen, 
Bakunin, Tolstoy, Turgenev, Dostoyevsky, even Nicholas I. 
Berlin’s subjects are also notably international, i.e., the Russian 
cast is engaged in constant dialogue, correspondence, mutual 
visitation, and so forth with European peers. Isaiah Berlin was 
writing about thinkers and thought in general. Our focus is con-
temporary Russian political thought. But it is worth clarifying 
who qualifies as a thinker and to what extent we see the exercise 
as national as opposed to transnational or international in scope.
If we wish to restrict ourselves to intellectuals, we will prob-
ably be disappointed, because Russian political thought today is 
not being shaped by the likes of Herzen or Dostoyevsky. If we 
limit ourselves to practicing politicians – starting, presumably, 
with President Vladimir Putin – we are impoverishing the exer-
cise in a certain sense but probably being more realistic. Public 
officials and politicians have helpers and speechwriters, as well 
as the odd gray cardinal behind the scenes (e.g., the legendary 
Vladislav Surkov, the ideological ‘vicar’ in Putin’s team from 
2000 to 2011) who supplies ideas to the helpers and wordsmiths. 
This wider cast of characters ought to be of high interest 
to us, but there are stumbling blocks: the ‘Surkovs’ of con-
temporary Russia operate in the shadows and do not commit 
all or even most of their thoughts to paper; and their role as 
‘political technologists’ is as much to disguise and truth and 
spin half-truths as it is to speak the truth. I refer you to even the 
title of Peter Pomerantsev’s provocative Nothing Is True and 
Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia.2 
Ideas shared by what we can simply call the Russian political 
elite – or political class – would make an inviting target, but 
one that does not lend itself to anecdotal analysis. There are 
sophisticated new tools of automated text analysis that could 
be employed here, but I am not aware of more than a few scat-
tered attempts to do so in the Russian case (I have had several 
graduate students make good efforts). It would be a good pro-
ject for someone to take on.
As for national vs. international contributions, a compre-
hensive investigation of contemporary Russian thought and its 
determinants cannot be carried out without extensive reference 
to factors that cut across state boundaries. This of course would 
apply to almost any country today. Russians travel far more than 
a generation ago, and they have the Internet on their PCs and 
smartphones. Putin travels only in a cocoon of officialdom and 
reportedly does not use a personal computer or smartphone 
(Medvedev does), but his handlers and ministers all do.
I do not mean to suggest that Russians are simply mimick-
ing something they see out there. As often as not, they may 
be reacting against something they see or think they see. For 
example, Putin in his September 2013 Valdai speech on Russian 
identity commented at length at undesirable cultural tenden-
cies (decline of religion and patriotism, same-sex marriages, 
etc.) and declared that Russia under his leadership would con-
sciously lean against those trends. Nonetheless, to lean against 
something is to be linked to it, and Russian thought is without 
interlinked with the bodies of thought prevalent in other coun-
tries and regions.
I think we will readily agree that Russian political thought, 
whatever exactly we mean by that, has been in flux for quite 
some time. Let us assume Russian political thought today is 
reliably sampled in the rhetoric of the national leader, in tran-
scripts of debates in parliament, and in opinion pieces pub-
lished in a handful of leading newspapers. Were we to com-
pare a 2015 sample with a 1995 sample, we surely would see 
2 Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: the Surreal heart 
of the new Russia, Public Affairs, New York 2014. I make this recommendation with-
out subscribing to, or for that matter being able to follow, all of Pomerantsev’s claims.
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many changes. What would we find it we did a longitudinal 
comparison with 2005, 1985 (as perestroika slouched toward 
Bethlehem to be born), 1975…1875? Would these differences 
be greater or lesser than what we would observe for another 
European country? More importantly, what would the nature 
of the differences (and similarities) be? I would know enough 
only to hazard the barest beginning on answers. What I do 
know is that ‘thought’ at any point in time is a multi-layered, 
multi-jointed construct, and that comparisons across time 
points involve linkages that are highly complex and sometimes 
ironic. Let us assume also that, after appropriate investigation 
and coding, we are able to pin down what the content of Rus-
sian political thought has been over the years and in what ways 
its content (as represented by leadership rhetoric, legislative 
debates, and opinion pieces) has shifted. The next and more 
daunting challenge is to figure out why this pattern of change/
continuity has come about. 
In this regard, to pick up on the half-baked points I ex-
pressed to Andrea Graziosi some months ago, it is vitally im-
portant for us to appreciate the possible patterns that, in the-
ory, the development of thought may possibly take. They are 
distinct and separable patterns, and constitute distinct and 
separable causal explanations, but the patterns are not mutual-
ly exclusive, in that they may be manifested simultaneously and 
in potentially elaborate combination with one another. The fol-
lowing, it seems to me, are some of the main logical possibili-
ties that might account for changes in Russia’s (or any place’s) 
manifest output of political thought over a given time interval.
1. Change at the individual level
Here is the natural place to start thinking about the phenomenon. 
Call it ‘Type 1.’ The reference is to individual actors who move 
over time from one political position to another, either gradual-
ly or in momentary ‘St. Paul on the road to Damascus’ fashion. 
For example, a particular Russian official or journalist may have 
possessed liberal views in the 1990s but by the 2010s has come to 
subscribe to étatisme and nationalism. We can all think of real-life 
Russians who fit this particular bill. What is sobering to realize is 
that many such persons, if they came of age early enough, would 
have had still another set of views in the 1970s, meaning that they 
had gone through multiple attitude shifts in one lifetime.
Attitudinal change at the individual level can occur through 
a variety of sequences. Which leads us into whole new realms 
of complexity. Let me mention just several of the possibilities 
worth considering by our discussion group as it proceeds:
a. Preference emergence: This is about the appearance of 
preferences from a tabula rasa or ‘near-tabula rasa,’ wherethere 
were no preferences (no thinking) before. For example: I didn’t 
used to care about X, I had no opinion, it was a vacuum in my 
head, but now I want X to be resolved this way or that.
b. Preference conversion: Here the sequence is about one 
preference being inverted to another under the influence of 
some contextual factor. So: I used to desire X but now I have 
come to desire Y.
c. Salience reordering: The shift in this frame concerns the 
relative importance of particular preferences, not their abso-
lute desirability. So: I have always thought we should have X, 
Y, and Z, but now I have come to realize that X is more impor-
tant than Y and Z, and to hell with Y and Z.
d. Disillusionment: In this two-step pattern, things get real-
ly complicated. There are recognizable echoes here of Russian 
experience. The sequence is: I thought X was a good idea, but 
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somebody let down my hopes, I was duped, and now I have 
decided to do Y as a reaction to my naive dreams being let 
down. Note that disillusionment can be combined with pref-
erence conversion, producing a highly combustible mix. Thus: 
I used to be in favor of Y and I embraced X only because some 
pied piper talked me into it; then I reverted to opinion Y, and 
strongly resent whoever it was that sold me on X.
2. Changed composition of the opinion aggregate – gradual
The driver for Types 2 and 3 is not changes in how a given in-
dividual or individuals think but changes in the composition of 
the relevant population. The population subtypes in this con-
struct are fixed; over time, the mix shifts, as more individuals 
of (fixed) opinion X are represented in the mix and fewer in-
dividuals of opinion Y are represented. In Type 2, the process 
whereby the population changes composition is a gradual one.
For gradual changes in composition of the population, the 
most obvious motor would be biology, in combination with a 
changing context – the ‘generational succession.’ Age cohorts 
would by and large retain the attitudes internalized in child-
hood and adult socialization; as the years go by, these people 
are replaced by children and grandchildren whose life experi-
ences were different. Jerry Hough years ago argued in a pres-
cient study that such a process was underway in the late Soviet 
administrative and leadership cadre. Students of democratiza-
tion in post–World War II Germany have made a similar claim 
about how successive cohorts of Germans after the loss of the 
war and occupation by the victors updated their preferences. 3
3. Changed composition of the opinion aggregate – sudden
The elite cadre does not have to change gradually. The process 
can be in principle be lightning-quick. In modern times, there 
are many ways such a reshuffle can occur. Let me limit the pos-
sibilities for Type 3 to two particularly suggestive possibilities:
a. Revolution: Russian history gives us ample empirical ma-
terial here. Russian political thought in 1925 was different from 
Russian political thought in 1895 because the elite had been 
repopulated as a result of the traumatic events of the Russian 
Revolution. Monarchists and organic conservatives were either 
dead or in mournful exile; Bolsheviks and their sympathizers 
manned the ramparts.
b. Power struggle: Again, Russia gives us classic examples. 
In the mid-1950s the Khrushchev group won out in the Krem-
lin over the likes of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. Ditto 
for the mid-1960s, when Brezhnev emerged to supreme. More 
to the point, Gorbachev and his supporters won the struggle of 
the mid-1980s and Yeltsin with a different crew on board took 
that of the 1990s, as well as Putin and his confederates after 
that. Putin won out in a power struggle involving wider circles 
of players than in Soviet times, in no small part by exploiting 
the support of his predecessor and patron, Yeltsin – who after 
the fact came to regret his role.
4. Censorship and self-censorship
In talking about a Type 4 I am on shakier ground. The issue 
is about what views are allowed to be expressed, publicly and 
privately, at acceptable cost to those who hold them. In today’s 
Russia, blogs and other social media may be a safety valve in 
this regard, but they do not mitigate the advantage Putin en-
joys through his exclusive control of national television, which 
3 See Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition, Brookings Institution, 
Washington D.C. 1980; and Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton & Kai Hildebrandt, 
Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA 1981.
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is the dominant source of news for up to 90 percent of adults. 
One can readily think of situations, and not just in Russia, 
where people (thinkers) are unable or unwilling to say what they 
really think, in which case the ‘thought’ one reads and hears 
expressed is a distorted or even completely falsified version of 
what people really think. The historian John Dower gives us an 
example from the attitudes of ordinary people in his wonderful 
book about U.S.-occupied, post-World War II Japan.
Put in Japanese terms, the emperor worship that so mesmerized Fellers4 
and other Western analysts appeared to have been in large part tatamae, 
a facade. Once defeat came home and the military state collapsed, the 
honne or true sentiment of ordinary Japanese revealed itself to be closer 
to mild attachment, resignation, even indifference where the imperial 
system and the vaunted national policy were concerned.5 
Closer to home, consider this excerpt from George Ken-
nan’s famous Long Telegram to the State Department from the 
Moscow embassy in February 1946, summarizing the USSR’s 
determination to press against Western interests at all cost:
[The] party line only represents [the] thesis which [the] official propa-
ganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public 
often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. 
[But, he continued, that was not so important for the U.S. govern-
ment]. [The] party line is binding for the outlook and conduct of 
people who make up the apparatus of power– party, secret police and 
government – and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.6 
In Type 4, if we are talking about change in thought, the en-
gine of change is not so much the revision of private opinions 
per se (Kennan’s “innermost thoughts”) but shifts in the bound-
aries of what may be expressed in public. The main lesson to be 
taken from this typology is that it is important for us to be clear 
about what underlying process is driving changes in Russian 
political thought. Is it change at the individual level, changed 
composition of the opinion aggregate, or a process of censorship 
or self-censorship of true opinions? Or, most likely, it is some 
composite of these several types, and their subtypes? Answers to 
this question will strongly influence not only what we conclude 
about trends in Russian thought but the strategies we employ, 
foreigners and Russians alike, to investigate and debate them.
4 Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers was MacArthur’s military secretary and 
head of psychological warfare.
5 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 
Norton, New York 1999, p. 302.
6 The “Long Telegram” entitled The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the 
Secretary of State, Moscow 22 February 1946, is online: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.
Part I
Imperial Identity and Soviet Heritage
Chapter I
On the Novelty of Patrimonialism in Putin’s Russia 
Stephen E. Hanson, College of William & Mary
The Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the sub-
sequent outbreak of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine mark a 
major change in the history of Europe and Eurasia, bringing a 
close to the once seemingly open-ended period of ‘postcom-
munism,’ which spanned the quarter century from the fall of 
the Berlin Wall until the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. 
In this essay, I will argue that understanding the evolution of 
political legitimacy in the postcommunist era from 1989-2014 
is vital for making sense of contemporary Russian authoritarian-
ism – and for formulating effective Western strategies for deal-
ing with Russia in the dramatic and dangerous new situation we 
have now entered. In particular, such an examination makes it 
clear that President Vladimir Putin’s turn toward a compara-
tively ‘pure’ form of patrimonial authoritarianism since return-
ing to the presidency for a third term in 2012 is in no way a 
continuation of late Soviet or post-Soviet practices, but instead 
marks a radical departure in how political rule in Russia is legit-
imated.1 Understanding the true novelty of patrimonialism in 
Putin’s Russia also reveals it to be a comparatively fragile form 
of order, especially in the context of intensifying globalization 
in the 21st century.
1 Stephen E. Hanson, Plebiscitarian Patrimonialism in Putin’s Russia,  Annals  of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 636 (1), July 2011, pp. 32-68.
The Power State Is Back? 3736 Stephen E. Hanson
1. The continuity thesis
The thesis that Putin’s regime is now patrimonial, and that 
this patrimonialism marks a sharp break in Russia’s contem-
porary history, contradicts several contemporary approaches 
to understanding Putinism in comparative perspective. After 
a quarter-century of intense political and social turbulence and 
uncertainty throughout Eurasia, it is remarkable how quickly 
scholars and analysts seem to have embraced what Stephen 
Cohen, in Soviet times, used to call the “continuity thesis” 2: 
namely, that even apparently dramatic changes in Russian soci-
ety only mask a “deeper” reality of cultural and political stasis. 
Indeed, Russia specialists from widely diverging scholarly 
camps have now converged in embracing this conclusion.
A first school of thought insists that ‘patrimonialism,’ in the 
classic Weberian sense, has actually been the dominant mode 
of governance in Russia from the tsarist period, through the 
Soviet period, and extending to the present day.3 From this 
point of view, Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s efforts to democratize 
and decentralize Russian politics in the 1980s and 1990s were 
simply anomalous, bound to fail in the face of a longstanding 
Russian ‘political culture’ of deference to central authority. 
In a similar vein, a growing number of authors now embrace 
the idea that President Putin is a new Russian ‘tsar’4 – not just 
metaphorically, but in fact. Indeed, this interpretation of Pu-
tin’s intensifying crackdown on all forms of political opposi-
tion is especially tempting given the fact that Putin’s own sup-
porters frequently make similar historical allusions.
The problem with the argument that Putin represents an 
unchanging Russian patrimonial culture, however, is precisely 
that it dismisses the significance of nearly three decades of re-
markably dramatic efforts to dismantle ‘Soviet totalitarianism’ 
and rebuild Russia on a new foundation of democratic legit-
imacy. We should remember that not that long ago, scholars 
and policymakers were lambasting the field of Soviet Studies 
for its collective underestimation of the impetus to dismantle 
the Leninist regime – a phenomenon that was entirely unex-
pected for those such as Richard Pipes5 who insisted that the 
USSR was simply a continuation of tsarist patrimonialism in 
Marxist-Leninist guise. Russian culture, like all other cultures, 
contains contradictory and complex impulses, some of which 
can be mobilized in support of the construction of personal-
ized and centralized authority, and some of which can be mo-
bilized to dismantle such forms of authority with remarkable 
speed. Buying into the Kremlin’s own myth-making that Putin 
is the rightful heir to past Russian state-builders may well blind 
us to the informal cultural repertoires of opposition to author-
ity that continue to play an important role in Russian politics.
2. The rational choice approach
To emphasize the relative novelty of Putin’s embrace of pure 
patrimonialism since 2012 also contradicts a ‘rational choice’ 
approach to Russian politics that focuses on political incentive 
structures rather than political beliefs. If one looks only at the 
‘technologies’ of governance, and not at legitimizing discourse, 
Putin’s authoritarianism would seem to have been firmly es-
tablished since at least 2004, when the last vestiges of serious 
partisan and elite opposition to his power were crushed. From 
2 Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History 
since 1917, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1985.
3  Getty, J. Arch. Practicing Stalinism: Bolsheviks, Boyars, and the Persistence of 
Tradition, Yale University Press, New Haven 2013.
4  See, for example, Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of 
Vladimir Putin, Knopf, New York 2015. 5 Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, Penguin, London 1997.
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this perspective, Russian politics in the mid-2010s looks quite 
similar to Russian politics a decade earlier. For that matter, ra-
tional choice institutionalists describe Yeltsin’s regime, too, as 
‘super-presidential.’ And Gorbachev never agreed to put his 
leadership to any sort of openly democratic electoral test, pre-
ferring to create a new ‘Soviet presidency’ while holding on 
to his position as General Secretary. A purely institutionalist 
approach to the analysis of Soviet and Russian ‘regime types,’ 
then, tends further to bolster the new consensus about Russian 
political continuity over time.
Even more sophisticated rational choice approaches to the 
analysis of Russian politics that take into account the periodic 
crises in Russian politics since 1991 tend nevertheless to bolster 
the ‘continuity thesis.’ Henry Hale, for example, argues that 
post-Soviet politics can be understood as essentially nothing 
more than a predictable set of regime cycles in which ‘patronal’ 
political machines rise and fall in response to the assessments of 
rational political actors concerning their future viability.6 Push-
ing the analysis back further in time, he argues that Russian “pa-
tronalism” has remained essentially unchanged since the early 
tsarist era: whether under the Romanovs or under the Bolshe-
viks, the building of “pyramids of power” dependent on the 
power of a single patron has been a standard political practice. 
Again, we are led to the conclusion that contemporary Putinism 
is only the latest in a long series of efforts in Russia to build a 
single national political machine.
One should not dismiss Hale’s argument too quickly. It can-
not be denied that the more optimistic analysts of Russia’s so-
called ‘transition to democracy’ in the 1990s often failed to un-
derstand the continuing centrality of brute machine politics, as 
well as the informal political arbitrariness operating behind the 
façade of democratic legality, in post-Soviet Russia. It is also 
clear that the ‘rational-legal’ notions of political legitimacy set 
out in formal documents, such as the Russian Constitution of 
1993, have turned out to have little practical effect on longer 
term institutional outcomes. Nevertheless, it is a mistake also to 
downplay entirely the importance of genuine belief in the ide-
als of Western democracy and liberalism (not always the same 
thing, it should be noted) in accounting for the conduct of key 
political actors in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Prin- 
cipled pro-Western activism on the part of those who organi- 
zed ‘informal’ movements for democratization was vital to the 
dynamic by which Gorbachev’s perestroika led to ever more 
revolutionary demands for institutional change and, in the end, 
to the collapse of Leninism in Russia. Principled pro-Western 
actors mobilized in important ways in the early Yeltsin era to 
back quite radical changes in Russia’s political economy that 
everyone now agrees were highly consequential – although the 
results of these changes were hardly what their authors initial-
ly envisaged. Even in the Putin era, significant public demon-
strations of opposition to the regime have repeatedly emerged. 
As recently as 2011-2012, prominent analysts of Russian affairs 
wondered if the Putin regime might fall as a result of mass 
protests against fraud in the 2011 Duma elections. That such 
predictions turned out ultimately to be incorrect should not 
lead us entirely to discount the potential for new unexpected 
upheavals in Russian politics and society in the future.
3. Virtual politics
Finally, advocates of a third school of thought about contempo-
rary Russian politics reject the idea that Putinism is ‘patrimo-
nial’ or even ‘patronal,’ instead calling into question whether 
it is possible to grasp the underlying mechanisms of Russian 
Stephen E. Hanson
6 Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014.
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political authority through any usual social scientific analysis.7 
An extreme version of this approach to Putinism insists that 
Russian politics today has become entirely ‘virtual’ – that 
‘truth’ can be manufactured by the authorities in any way they 
choose, and that only the most naïve of analysts could imagine 
that anyone in Russia actually believes in his or her professed 
‘political principles.’8 To be sure, there is an important grain 
of truth to this position: there can be no doubt that in com-
parative perspective, the collapse of Marxism-Leninism in 
1991 left in its wake a Russian society profoundly allergic to 
political ideology in its 20th century form. In this social context, 
it has been comparatively easy for ‘political technologists’ in 
the Kremlin’s employ to ‘manufacture’ ersatz political parties, 
social movements, and even ‘facts’ in the service of the state, 
without encountering sustained social resistance. Adopting 
this cynical approach to the analysis of Russian affairs leads 
to a different version of the continuity thesis: since ideology 
and political principles are seen as irrelevant to the study of 
political manipulation in Russia, the country’s history can be 
interpreted as a whole series of elite conspiracies to fool a gul-
lible public – whether via Potemkin villages, Marxist-Leninist 
dogma, or claptrap about ‘democracy.’
There are serious methodological problems with this cyni-
cal interpretation of Russian history, of course: if all empirical 
evidence of genuine ideological commitment among politicians 
in the tsarist, Soviet, Yeltsin, or Putin eras is taken to be suspect 
a priori, the argument that ‘legitimacy’ in Russia is nothing but 
a sham will inevitably – and tautologically-seem more compel-
ling. Yet the very fact that Putin and his elite have chosen in 
response to the political protests of 2011-12 fully to embrace a 
discourse of Orthodoxy, Eurasianism, homophobia, and anti- 
liberal nationalism demonstrates that in fact Russian politics 
today is far from ‘post-modern.’ Indeed, what is most striking 
about Russian political discourse in Putin’s second presidential 
term is how deadly earnest it is. The tongue-in-cheek, self-aware 
quality of pro-Putin propaganda in the 2000s – encapsulated in 
the silly popular song about how young women would prefer 
‘a man like Putin’ – has given way to an unsettling drumbeat of 
dark conspiracy theories about the nefarious intentions of the 
West, with little if any sense of fun. Apparently, Kremlin ‘tech-
nologists’ have discovered, ironically, that it takes real ideas 
that resonate within Russian society, not fake ones, to mobilize 
real people to fight and die for the state. The ‘virtual politics’ 
school has in this way missed something crucial about impor-
tant changes in Russian state-society relations since 2011.
4. The Weberian approach
Thus, it appears that whether Putin’s contemporary regime is 
examined from a cultural, a rationalist, or a postmodern point 
of view, the end result is the same: the postcommunist ‘transi-
tion,’ which had once seemed to represent the most dramatic 
change in Russian political history since the early 20th centu-
ry, has essentially accomplished nothing. In a strange way, too, 
these analyses leave us with the impression that no one is really 
to blame for the dashing of early post-Soviet dreams of a trans-
formed Russia. It was simply foolish, it seems, to think that 
old patterns of authoritarian rule could ever be reformed in a 
country where ordinary people are powerless against authority 
and no one truly believes in anything beyond self-interest.
Yet there are good reasons to believe that the new ‘Russian 
continuity thesis’ is no less misleading than the old, Soviet-era 
Stephen E. Hanson
7 The most influential recent analysis of Putin’s Russia in this vein is 
Peter Pomarantsev, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: Adventures in Modern 
Russia, Faber & Faber, London 2014.
8 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, 
Yale University Press, New Haven 2005.
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version. For one thing, such a viewpoint can unwittingly rein-
force popular stereotypes, both in Russia and in the West, that 
there is a mysterious ‘civilizational’ divide between ‘Orthodox’ 
Eurasia and the lands of ‘Western Christendom.’ For another, 
it is just as likely to blind us to sources of institutional fragility 
in Putin’s Russia as the Soviet-era continuity thesis did with 
respect to the potential significance of Gorbachev’s reforms. 
How might we find a way, then, to take seriously the compar-
ative similarities of Putinism in the mid-2010s to earlier forms 
of Russian authoritarianism, while still taking into account the 
possibilities for unexpected and potentially dramatic political 
change in the years and decades to come?
As I have argued elsewhere,9 a return to the original works 
of the theorist who first introduced the concept of ‘legitimate 
domination’ to the social sciences, Max Weber, provides a 
needed alternative to the dominant contemporary paradigms in 
Russian studies. After all, ‘patrimonialism’ itself is a Weberian 
concept. Yet Weber’s work on political legitimation is typically 
poorly understood, both by analysts who reject his views – and 
by many who think they embrace them. Clearly the position 
that political ideas and principles are irrelevant to politics is 
foreign to Weberian thinking, but so too is the argument that 
Russian politics has simply been unchangingly ‘patrimonial’ 
in nature for the past five centuries. Indeed, Weber’s original 
research on the Russian Revolution of 1905, based on his analy- 
sis of Russian-language sources, clearly shows his own deep 
appreciation of the possibilities for democratic change in the 
context of patrimonial tsarism. 10
In particular, Weber’s theory of legitimate domination is 
distinguished by three key features that are often absent in 
contemporary misreadings of his work. To begin with, Weber’s 
primary concern is to understand the ‘legitimacy’ of orders giv-
en by elites to their ‘staff’ – not with the legitimacy of ‘states’ 
within broader ‘societies.’ His focus is thus both narrow and 
tractable: to what extent to the people entrusted by rules to 
carry out orders on behalf of the state subjectively believe that 
they have a ‘duty,’ and not only an interest, to obey? If state 
officials do believe in their duty to obey the leader, Weber ar-
gues, the resulting order is likely to be more stable than if state 
officials act purely out of self-interest. To answer this question, 
mass public opinion polls – however useful they might be for 
other forms of social science analysis – are simply irrelevant. 
Indeed, for Weber, a form of rule can be highly legitimate for 
the elites and staffs who enforce it, and simultaneously rejected 
as alien and oppressive by masses within society at large. Thus 
the common assumption that Putin’s high popularity ratings 
are evidence of the regime’s ‘legitimacy’ represents a misunder-
standing of the Weberian approach.
Second, Weber’s theory is parsimonious. He famously in-
sists that in the history of humanity to date, there have only 
been three effective sources for the belief that rulers have a 
right to give orders to staff. ‘Traditional’ legitimacy is rooted 
in the subjective belief by the ruler’s staff that obedience to the 
orders of the ruler is inherent in the ways of one’s community 
since ‘time immemorial.’ ‘Rational-legal’ legitimacy is based on 
the subjective belief that obedience to state commands is man-
dated by legal and/or constitutional principles that have been 
duly enacted according to impersonal procedures. And ‘charis- 
matic’ legitimacy is based on the subjective belief that obedi- 
ence to the leader is mandated by his (or, rarely, her) unique 
understanding of the will of God, destiny, or some other ‘tran-
scendental’ force. These three ‘ideal types’ of legitimate domi-
Stephen E. Hanson
9 Stephen E. Hanson, Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Forma-
tion in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010.
10 Max Weber, The Russian Revolutions, translated and edited by Gordon C. 
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nation, according to Weber, never exist anywhere in absolutely 
pure form; they intermingle in complex ways in every empiri-
cally-existing form of political order. Yet essentially, only these 
three forms of ‘legitimate domination’ together or separately 
have proven effective in the construction of enduring forms of 
political organization. Hence it is possible for social scientists to 
categorize ‘regime types’ in a way that can enable comparative 
analysis while not oversimplifying their empirical complexity. 11
Third, Weber’s approach to the study of legitimate dom-
ination welds together the study of ‘ideas’ in politics and the 
analysis of economic factors that clearly help to determine state 
stability. Contrary to some interpretations of Weber’s sociol-
ogy, he is well aware that no form of political order can sur-
vive indefinitely if it fails to provide material benefits to those 
who support it. Traditional forms of political domination 
‘work,’ in the end, because the upholding of elite-sanctioned 
conceptions of ‘tradition’ tends to pay off for state elites in the 
form of privileged access to economic surplus. Rational-legal 
political orders typically marry the upholding of the ‘rule of 
law’ with systems of property rights and capital accumulation 
that provide material benefits to elites who work within them. 
Even charismatic domination depends on the validation of the 
leader’s claims to extraordinary status through periodic ‘mira-
cles’ of material success (whether these are gained through the 
spoils of war, through revolutionary expropriations of prop-
erty, or through sheer good luck). Yet although all types of 
legitimate domination rest ultimately on a material foundation, 
Weber argues that they remain analytically distinct. Contrary 
to cynical, post-modern, and rational choice interpretations of 
politics, political actors can simultaneously benefit materially 
from their position within a regime – and believe subjectively 
that these benefits are right, holy, and/or just according to their 
deeply-held principles. Indeed, ‘legitimate domination’ is effec-
tively precise because it produces a social context in which elites 
typically do not distinguish between their ‘ideal’ and ‘material’ 
interests in upholding the established order.
For Weber, patrimonialism was a subtype of traditional 
legitimate domination. It is built not only on the claim of the 
ruler to represent ‘sacred tradition’ that must be upheld, but 
also, more specifically, on his claim to be the patriarchal male 
authority figure with rightful sole possession of all of the state and 
with the arbitrary discretion to utilize its assets as he pleases. 12 
Patrimonialism’s material basis rests on the ruler’s ability to 
reward faithful members of the ruling ‘household’ with state 
assets, legitimating such conduct by depicting the ruler and 
his ruling elite as the heir to historical traditions of imperial 
and religious greatness. Such a description of Putin’s regime 
after 2012 does seem reasonably apt. However, utilizing this 
framework to analyze Russian history in the longer term, it 
becomes clear that the patrimonial ideal type has rarely been 
appropriate to describe the key features of the Russian state. 
In fact, from a Weberian perspective that takes modes of legit-
imate domination seriously, we can discern at least five distinct 
‘regime types’ since the beginning of the 20th century.
As Pipes famously argued, tsarism under the Romanovs 
certainly did have prominent patrimonial features, with the 
tsar claiming his right to rule consistently on the basis of histor-
ical dynastic inheritance and ‘divine right’ bestowed by God, 
and distributing state assets to the court in ways rarely bound 
by rational-legal proceduralism. To be sure, there is a rich his-
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11 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Voll. I-II, translated and edited by Guen-
ther Roth and Klaus Wittich, University of California Press, Berkeley 1978.
12 See also Julia Adams, The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capi-
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toriography calling into question Pipes’s argument that all of 
Russian imperial history from Ivan the Terrible to Nicholas II 
can be analyzed as ‘patrimonial’ in an undifferentiated way – 
especially after the constitutional reforms introduced after the 
Russian Revolution of 1905. Yet it is nevertheless true that the 
last Russian tsar until the very end did prove remarkably 
unwilling to break formally with the core claim that his right 
to rule rested on religion and tradition, and not on any form of 
legal-rational authority.
The Russian Revolution of 1917, however, brought tsarist 
patrimonialism to a decisive close, and – after a brief, troubled 
experiment with ‘legal-rational authority’ in the form of the 
Provisional Government – replaced it with a self-consciously 
‘revolutionary’ regime. The new Bolshevik leadership built its 
legitimacy around a novel combination of charismatic promis-
es to transcend all past forms of social oppression with rational- 
legal proceduralism in the building of new party and state insti-
tutions – a novel regime-type Jowitt has characterized as “charis- 
matic impersonalism.” 13 Despite disputes and policy debates 
among rival Bolshevik and Soviet leaders through Soviet history, 
this basic conception of legitimacy endured through the late 
Gorbachev era, until the failed August coup of 1991 brought 
a final end to Leninist rule in Russia and the rest of the for-
mer Soviet Union. It is telling that even toward the end of the 
perestroika period, Gorbachev saw himself as acting in a way 
consistent with ‘Leninist’ principles, even if by the end he had 
very little clear sense of how such principles might be translated 
into any workable institutional system. 14
5. Russia’s post-imperial democracy: Putin’s specificity
What replaced Leninism in 1991 was not renewed patrimoni-
alism, but instead a protracted, flawed, but nevertheless conse-
quential effort to establish more fully rational-legal constitutional 
politics in the new ‘Russian Federation.’ Russian ‘liberal capital-
ism’ in the 1990s was clearly very weakly consolidated, subject 
to nearly constant political, economic, social, and international 
challenges; in this respect, it can be fruitfully compared to other 
weak ‘post-imperial democracies’ such as the early French Third 
Republic and Weimar Germany. But notwithstanding President 
Boris Yeltsin’s frequent invocation of executive decree power, 
his increasing reliance on members of the former Soviet security 
services, the flaws in Russian elections at all levels of the feder-
ation, and the pervasive corruption of the post-Soviet Russian 
bureaucracy, it is a mistake to assimilate the entirety of the 1990s 
to the paradigm of ‘Russian patrimonialism.’ In fact, Yeltsin’s 
explicit efforts to legitimate his rule with reference to Western 
ideals of ‘democracy’ and ‘capitalism’ in a geopolitical context 
where such terms looked increasingly to most Russians like a 
justification for the gradual destruction of the Russian state has 
played a fateful role in undermining rational-legal forms of legit-
imacy more generally in Russian society.
Indeed, even after Vladimir Putin’s selection as Yeltsin’s 
‘heir’ in 1999 and his election as Russia’s new president in 
2000, significant ‘plebiscitarian’ elements of political legitimacy 
– in which periodic affirmative votes by ‘the people’ were cited 
as by Putin’s elite as central to their right to rule – remained 
prominent alongside the emerging patrimonial themes in the 
construction of Putin’s presidential regime in the 2000s. With-
out taking into account the regime’s reliance on plebiscitarian 
democracy for its legitimation, it is impossible to account for 
Putin’s decision to step down formally as President in favor 
of his protégé Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 to preserve the con-
Stephen E. Hanson
13 Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction, University of Cal-
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14 Stephen E. Hanson, Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of 
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Chapter II
The ‘Great Power’ Ideologeme as a Condition  
of Putin’s Regime Legitimacy
Lev Gudkov, Levada Center
1. Restoring consensus 
The year 2014 in Russia was marked with an unprecedented 
growth of internal aggression, intolerance and simultaneously – 
national pride, reflected in near unanimous support of the coun-
try’s policies. Such a result was insured through very effective, 
focused and absolutely cynical Kremlin propaganda and the war 
in Ukraine helping to revive patriotism. In December 2014, 87 
per cent of Russian citizens surveyed by Levada Center were 
convinced that Western countries were pursuing a hostile agen-
da towards Russia (while only 8 per cent disagreed with them).
The annexation of Crimea and the instigation and provoca-
tion by Russia of civil war in the Ukraine has broken the trend 
in domestic political development that has manifested follow-
ing the economic crisis of 2008-2009: decrease of Putin’s popu-
larity, weakening of the authorities’ legitimacy and increase 
in social tensions. By the end of 2013, Putin’s personal rating 
had hit the lowest level of his entire ‘reign.’ Mass discontent 
was caused by the decrease in state social expenses, increase 
of bureaucratic pressure on business and social life, onset of 
corruption scandals among policy makers, uncertainty about 
the future under an authoritarian rule. Putin’s regime turned 
out to be incapable of fulfilling the paternalistic expectations 
of his ‘subjects.’
stitutional limit on presidential terms set out in the Russian 
Constitution of 1993. And it is precisely the transformation of 
the ‘plebiscitarian patrimonialism’ of 2000-2011 into the more 
straightforward patrimonialism of Putin’s third term, in the 
wake of the significant opposition protests of 2011- 2012, that 
defines the dramatically new situation we are witnessing in 
today’s Russian polity.
Contemporary Putinism, then, cannot simply be under-
stood as a continuation of earlier trends in Russian politics. 
Instead, it emerged out of a specific domestic and international 
context, within which alternative possibilities for constructing 
legitimacy in the postcommunist era were successively tried 
and discarded. From this perspective, Putin’s relatively pure 
patrimonialism in the contemporary period represents not 
continuity in Russian political history, but instead a dramatic 
political rupture with the country’s modes of governance since 
at least the early 20th century. Moreover, Putin’s decision to 
jettison the remnants of plebiscitarianism in favor of patri-
monial legitimation – turning against the very same ‘modern’ 
elites that Yeltsin’s reforms tried to create – appears from this 
perspective not a return to time-tested Russian traditions, but 
instead a risky gamble. Patrimonial traditionalism, after all, is 
an awkward fit for a Russian political economy that is still en-
meshed in global capitalist institutions, and a highly-educated 
Russian society that has been open to the West for more than 
a generation. Given the severe economic challenges facing 
Russia in the era of fracking and low energy prices, it appears 
doubtful at best that the short term nationalist fervor Putin has 
managed to generate through domestic paeans to the machismo 
of the leader and international adventures in Ukraine and Syria 
can be sustained for long.
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The authorities responded to the protest movement of 
2011-2013 by acutely intensifying repressions against the oppo- 
sition and civil society organizations, marginalizing indepen- 
dent media, returning state censure and transforming the mass 
media into total propaganda tools. Elimination of free elections 
and tightening of administrative control over public activities 
demanded that the judiciary system be further subdued by the 
president’s administration, the authority of political police and 
other special services be expanded, marked changes be made to 
the legislation and law enforcement practice, as well as signifi-
cant modifications to state cultural and educational policy.
Such an evolution of the authoritarian regime determined 
by the self-preservation of ruling groups seems rather logical. 
Taking their limited intellectual, cultural and symbolic resources 
into consideration, it means not simply an imitation or return 
of soviet institutional practices and mass beliefs but a kind of 
revision to late totalitarianism. 
Militarist and anti-liberal, antidemocratic and anti-western 
rhetoric has caused an ideological mobilization of the popu-
lace restoring consensus between the state and society. Starting 
from March 2014, 83-87 per cent of respondents spoke of their 
approval and support of Putin’s policies. The means used to 
bring Russian society into a state of fever pitch point to the latent 
structures that determine the stability of this socio-cultural 
system: totalitarian institutes (the organization of authority) 
have weakened in the last 25 years, having been partly distorted 
or changed but not disposed of. Thus, I want to underline this 
important methodological aspect: the newest events and phe-
nomena (late phases) allow us to understand the importance of 
previous forms of organization and mechanisms of reproduc-
tion of the Soviet system, and therefore the evolution of Rus-
sia’s political system and ideology. The system itself (entity) has 
fallen apart, but separate institutes of late soviet totalitarianism 
– such as authority organization, court, army, education – have 
turned out to be ‘viable’ and active.
 The point of Putin’s policy – the character of leaders’ iden-
tity and purpose – is a regeneration of the domination structure 
under new conditions, namely the processes of the totalitarian 
system crash routinization. The domination technology is being 
based on privatization of the state by authority clans consisting of 
former special services and security agencies members on the one 
hand and keeping society in a state of apathy with a lack of politi-
cal choice, creating an absence of alternatives to the existing order.
2. Recovering ‘great power’ memory and its collective identity
Insufficient legitimacy makes the current regime search for 
a means of generating mass support by turning to the ideol-
ogy of groups that have already vacated the political scene: 
social-political conservatism, traditionalism, and Orthodoxy. 
Endorsement of Putin and Medvedev 
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The efforts of the Kremlin’s political engineers come down 
to suppressing all opportunities of rationalizating and moral 
processing of the totalitarian past thereby discrediting and 
paralyzing the very thought of possible change to the politi-
cal order (necessity of reform, modernization and democracy). 
Ideologically this restoration process is justified through the 
rhetoric of ‘Great Power’ and the mythology of the traditional 
or imperial past, satisfying the mass demand for recovering a 
prior collective identity. The return to superpower status along 
with crisis rescue were determined as priorities by the masses’ 
expectations of the ascension to power by an authoritarian 
leader in the late 1990s. Compared to this even the escalating 
social problems – corruption, crime, degradation of medical 
services etc. – were seen as less important by the populace. 
The first attempts at conservative consolidation of Russia’s 
society – the search for a ‘national idea’ after the questionable 
presidential election of 1996 – were undertaken back in Yel- 
tsin’s time, but it was only under Putin’s imitation of Soviet 
style leadership that it became the basis of the political course.
What was done by Vladimir Putin  
during his stay in power?1
Over the last 10 years, the respect for Russia in the world 
has increased, decreased or remained the same as it was?
  1 Levada-Tsentr, Survey ranged by 2015, N=800, in percentage, May 2015.
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Key ideological points of modern Russian nationalism are 
closely related to the traumatic experience of the Soviet col-
lapse and the defeat in the Cold War. Superpower status holds 
the central place in the structure of collective identity of Rus-
sians. The sense of belonging to a huge country that ‘everybody 
used to respect and fear,’ identification with one of the two 
most powerful military states compensated the ‘small men’ and 
the persistently present feeling of daily humiliation, the sense 
of chronic poverty, powerlessness and dependence on the arro-
gant and despotic authorities.2 In this regard, Russian national-
ism – no matter how different its versions and currents – is fed 
by the negative energy of mass resentment on the one hand and 
collective frustration on the other. Russian nationalism – which 
the legitimacy of Putin’s regime is built upon – is devoid of vi-
sions of the future; it faces the mythologized past, is concerned 
mostly with searching for internal and external enemies – those 
guilty of the empire’s crash, the country’s degradation, the failed 
transition to democracy, the unfulfilled modernization etc.
3. An eclectic conservative approach
The subject of Russian nationalism is an extirpation of obses-
sive national inferiority complexes and the sore feelings regard-
ing the historical state of backwardness and archaism. Its ideol-
ogy has a defensive, compensatory, consolatory character being 
the dark side of the weakening great power consciousness. 
Therefore, it doesn’t propose and isn’t capable of proposing 
any development goals. Such ideologemes are activated every 
time a crisis within a political system unfolds; a power shift is-
sue arises and therefore creates the demand and necessity to 
justify and legitimize it. The semantical basis for glorification 
(or vilification) of the authorities may vary radically: from nos-
talgia over soviet communism to the splendor and greatness of 
the former Russian Empire, from myths about racial suprem-
acy of Russians to Orthodox fundamentalism. Nevertheless, 
their function remains purely conservative – an apology of the 
dominant existing structure instead of formulation of political 
objectives for national development.
How would you describe the current government?3 Is Russia now 
a great power? 4
  2 The level and depth of mass frustration caused by the collapse of the USSR 
and the disintegration of the soviet institutional system is clearly underestimated by 
political scientists and social analysts. 
3 Levada-Tsentr, Survey referred to March 2015, in percentage, May 2015.
4 Levada-Tsentr, Survey ranged by 2009 (N=1600), since 2010 (N=800), in 
percentage, May 2015.
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 “Russia’s renaissance,” “getting up from our knees,” 
announced by Putin in the mid-2000-s is set to overcome the 
national state of humiliation. In this context “the eternal oppo-
sition of Russia and the West” as separate ‘civilizations’ closed 
off from each other is acquiring traits of collective metaphysics 
as we speak and doesn’t require special justification and there-
fore the policy pursued by the regime doesn’t need additional 
arguments and proof. The meaning of this reactionary utopia 
is in conserving what is by now a no alternatives domination 
system and – as the drift – in discrediting the ideas and princi-
ples of ‘open society,’ constitutional state, and modernization. 
Acceptance of democratic and liberal values inevitably leads to 
the acceptance of the need for further institutional reform and 
change of the current political system as a prerequisite of eco-
nomic growth, social prosperity and technological progress.
Putin’s ideology – restoration of the moral and political uni-
ty of the authorities and the people – boils down to the follow-
ing ideas: ‘stability’ – unchangeability of the authorities – over-
coming the ‘chaos’ caused by Yeltsin’s reforms; ‘traditionalism,’ 
a special role of Orthodoxy and its importance in the matter of 
society’s ‘moral upbringing’; fighting against Western influence 
– civil society organizations as well as constitutional state and 
human rights movements were appointed ‘agents’ thereof by 
the Kremlin’s political engineers.
 This national ideology presents an eclectic mix of all pre-
vious justifications of Russian nationalism: the rehabilitation of 
Stalin and the soviet state system are combined here with the 
glorification of the tsar’s ministers and generals; increase of mil-
itarist rhetoric with orthodoxy; pious censure of culture, media 
and education with a ban on critical analysis of the soviet past.
Restoration of patriotic pride – in the absence of tangible 
achievements – could only happen at the expense of imposing 
the notion of the surrounding world’s hostility towards the na-
tion upon the populace. The idea of the country’s hostile envi-
ronment, the perception that the West strives to weaken Russia 
by dislodging it from its traditional area of national interest – the 
former USSR territory – to get control of its primary resources 
has been insistently impressed upon Russia’s populace, especial-
ly following Putin’s Munich speech in 2007.5 Propaganda con-
stantly propagates the idea that western countries – especially 
the US – strive to abate Russia, dismember it, take control of its 
opulent resources, that the West is a historical enemy that plants 
the morals and ideology of liberalism and human rights foreign 
to Russian culture and destroying the basis of state solidarity.
5 Putin’s speech on 10 February 2007 at 43rd Munich Security Conference is 
online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkyjYKVYlWo.
6 Levada-Tsentr, Survey ranged by N = 1600 (several answers are possible), in 
percentage, May 2015.
What are your feelings regarding the Russian Government’s 
decision to annex Crimea into the Russian Federation?6
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Thus the idea of Russia’s ‘unique way’ differs from western 
modernization, based on the need for self-reliance and auton-
omous economic development without which the country’s 
safety cannot be guaranteed. The pursuit of self-isolation has 
already reached its peak after Putin’s Crimean conquest and the 
introduction of western sanctions against Russia.
This policy turned out to be rather successful, at least short 
term. If at the end of Yeltsin’s era 72 per cent of those surveyed 
thought that Russia had lost the Great Power status and the 
authority and influence in the world that went with it and that 
the USSR used to have (most of them thought back then that it 
would be forever): However, after the annexation of the Crimea 
the situation changed dramatically: in March 2014 68 per cent 
thought that the country had always been and still remained a 
Great Power. The wave of anti-western sentiment created by 
propaganda was accompanied by experiencing pride for Russia 
and for being a part of it. The survey of October 2014 demon-
strated the highest level of this sort of ‘pride’ during the whole 
period of study (86 per cent). 64 per cent agreed that “Russia is 
better than the majority of other countries.”
The main motif of the pro-Kremlin media is in the allega-
tion that the Euromaidan of 2013-2014 was a link in a chain 
of mass disturbances inspired by the US throughout the world 
and social-political coups prepared with the help of the Inter-
net and social networks, the activity of foreign foundations and 
non-governmental organizations. The 2003 ‘Rose revolution’ 
in Tbilisi, and the ‘orange revolution’ in Kiev, and the events in 
the Arab world are presented by the propaganda as attempts to 
establish regimes dependent on the West.
As a result of the CPSU crash, the mass disappointment in 
the consequences of the reforms undertaken by the democrats 
in the 1990s and finally the elimination of free political competi-
tion by Putin’s regime and systematic sterilization of the political 
and informational landscape the ideological views and positions 
of the populace are markedly undefined and unexpressed. Only 
half of Russia’s populace demonstrates partiality to this or that 
political party program. Out of those about 20 per cent of the 
surveyed share communist views. The majority (48-50 per cent) 
consider themselves proponents of ‘social-democracy’ (neces-
sity of social state, insuring the “fair distribution of national in-
come,” security of the poor and socially weak populace groups 
in a market economy). In essence it’s a somewhat humanized 
soviet version of state paternalism, an inertial multitude of 
degraded notions of “human faced socialism” born back in mid 
1960s. Hardcore Russian nationalists make up 16 per cent, and 
pro-western liberals – a bit less than that.
The cause of mass conservatism is not in mythologized Rus-
sian traditionalism per se, but in the lack of understanding as 
to what the country’s mid- and long-term future might be. This 
causes the majority of the populace to hold on to the present, 
evaluating it solely from the point of view of the past (that is to 
In your opinion, is Putin guilty of abuse of power  
as he is under an accusation by his opponents? 7
7 Levada-Tsentr, Survey ranged by N = 1600, in percentage, May 2015.
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say, basing their orientations and life strategies on ‘the worst’). 
The rigidity of Russia’s mass consciousness stems from the 
experience of survival under conditions of artificially created 
absence of alternative. Lack of choice is the result of the dom-
inant technologies used by the authoritarian regime, purpose- 
ful social policy of a state not controlled by the populace and 
therefore feeling no sense of responsibility for its actions.
In fact, it’s an adaptation to political, legislative and eco-
nomic arbitrariness of the authorities. Under Putin Russian 
society has been forced to ‘forgo’ participation in politics in 
exchange for paternalistic ‘guarantees’ of existence. In such a 
society everyday structures play the determining role of routini-
zation and life stability mechanisms. Under conditions of sup-
pression of group interest representation, impossibility of polit-
ical party competition, the very mechanisms of determination 
In your opinion, what is primarily evidenced  
by the annexation of Crimea by Russia? 8
of the future (political goal-setting structures) degrade which 
means that quotidian life determines the framework of mass 
requirements (the horizon of possibilities as practically desired, 
“no worse than”) and life strategies of ‘reductive adaptation’ and 
lowering of demands (‘Russian patience’). This is the meaning 
and essence of philistine conformism.
Thus, the suppression of liberal and democratic ideology – 
westernizing modernization of the country – in the 2000s has 
led to a rise of archaic or preceding culture layers and respective 
political views, which served as a base for the relegitimation of 
Putin’s regime.
8   Levada-Tsentr, Survey ranged by N = 1600 (several answers are possible), in 
percentage of respondents, May 2015. 
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Chapter III
Nation, Nation-State, State-Nation 
      and Empire-State in Post-Soviet Russia
Alexey Miller, European University 
in Saint-Petersburg, Central European University
By the early 20th century Russian elites had developed sophis-
ticated vocabulary and conceptual repertoire sufficient to dis-
cuss the issues of state structure and its relationship to territo-
rial autonomy, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity.1 It was 
closely linked to the European debates of the time. Of course, 
the field was also densely populated by various radical and/or 
primitive publicists, but this is the case everywhere.
1. The ‘national debate’ in contemporary Russia
By the end of the communist period, Russians were practically 
deprived of this heritage. Issues of nationalism and state struc-
ture were among the most strictly controlled and censored in the 
Soviet Union. When I first started checking the existing histori-
cal literature on the national question in 1996, I discovered that 
there was only one (sic!) article, 2 published on nationalism in the 
Romanov Empire during the latter two decades of Soviet rule.
History of post-communist Russian thought about nation(s) 
and state is the history of erroneous translations, misinterpre-
tations, blind spots and superficial borrowings from the reper- 
toire of western scholarship and journalism. When dealing 
with these issues, Russian thought demonstrated an inclina-
tion towards creating ideologically driven projects, which are 
poorly connected to observations of reality on the ground and 
are only vaguely formulated in practical terms. In other words, 
we are dealing with a specific feature of political culture that is 
attendant to Russia’s entire political spectrum, a feature that 
does not presuppose productive discussion but that regards 
the makers of intellectual products as mutually ‘hostile’ groups 
battling for the minds of the masses that consume their prod-
ucts. The concept of res publica is almost entirely absent.
On the one hand, this situation tells us that the affirmation 
of the nation as an overall political framework is encountering 
serious difficulties in Russia and, on the other hand, it delineates 
the need to create such a framework.
A distinguishing feature of the debate about the nation in 
modern Russia is that the subject of this debate encompasses 
too many crucial issues at once. One would be hard pressed to 
find another country in which, at one and the same time, there 
is no consensus on such a broad range of basic topics. There 
is no agreement on whether Russia should be considered a 
nation-state or on whether we should strive to make it such a 
state. Those who called themselves liberals claimed that Russia 
should become a ‘normal nation-state,’ based on civic ‘rossiy-
skaya natsiya.’ Some have flatly declared that Russia not only 
was an empire but is doomed to remain an empire, so no nation- 
state need be built in Russia. Others say that Russia needs to 
look for some sort of fundamentally new construct, because 
both the traditional form of empire and the traditional form of 
the nation-state have become obsolete. Still others in our soci- 
ety take the view that there is a nation, but that we simply fail to 
understand this point or are unwilling to acknowledge it.3 
1    See Alexey Miller, Istoriya ponyatiya natsiya v Rossii, in Alexey Miller et.al. 
(eds.), «Ponyatiya o Rossii». K istoricheskoy semantike imperskogo perioda, vol.2, 
Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye, Moskva 2012, pp. 7-49. 
2  Valentin Semenovich Dyakin, Natsional’nyy vopros vo vnutrenney politike 
tsarizma (nachalo XX v.), Voprosy Istorii, 11-12, 1996.
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There is no consensus on whether Russia’s present-day bor-
ders should be accepted as given. Many say that we should strive 
to expand them, under the banner of either ‘restoring the USSR’ 
or creating a new planned empire of some sort or through Rus-
sian irredentism – that is, an effort to annex territories with large 
Russian populations in order to save Russians from various mis-
fortunes. In fact, two of these motifs (fighting for great power 
status and irredentism) were used in one and the same speech by 
President Putin, when he explained the motives for the incorpo-
ration of Crimea into the Russian Federation.4 
Concurrently, there is a view that Russia needs to rid itself 
of certain ‘undesirable’ territories that are currently a part of it. 
With regard to this, some have spoken – and continue to still – 
of Chechnya in particular, whereas others have talked about the 
autonomous Caucasus republics of Russia as a whole.
Finally, there is a whole knot of contradictions over the ques-
tions of “what kind” of nation exists in Russia, what kind of na-
tion is needed – a nation of Russian citizens (rossiyskaya natsiya) 
or of ethnic Russians (russkaya natsiya) – and what exactly these 
concepts mean. Those taking part in these disputes constantly 
invoke public sentiments, and they often perceive such senti-
ments in mutually exclusive ways. In other words, those engaged 
in this polemic cannot even agree on how most of the country’s 
citizens feel about these issues.
2. The ‘rossiyskaya natsiya’
Another significant problem is the absence of public consensus 
with regards to the concept of the ‘Russian nation.’ In official, 
‘politically correct’ language, rossiyane and rossiyskaya natsi- 
ya are considered the norm. But this is not the case in everyday 
speech. Often rossiyskiy serves not as a unifying term but as a 
marker of non-Russian ethnicity. For example, we now speak 
confidently of Ivan Pavlov as a “great russkiy scientist” and 
Georgy Zhukov as a “great russkiy military leader.” But in speak-
ing of another Noblist, Vitaly Ginzburg, many people will catch 
themselves and describe him as a “great rossiyskiy scholar.”
I will not cite any examples of critical or ironic comments about 
‘Russian citizenship’ (rossiyskost’), but there are a myriad. Those 
who make them are not necessarily inclined toward racism or 
tribal nationalism. One often hears the suggestion simply to replace 
rossiyskiy with russkiy, provided that russkiy is used to signify a 
community open to people of any ethnic or racial background.
The negative attitude that many Russians have toward the 
concept rossiyskost’ grows out of a suspicion that it is a substi-
tute for ‘Soviet citizenship’ (sovetskost’) which in certain peri-
ods relied heavily on the suppression of Russian ethnicity. Those 
who are not ethnic Russians also perceive a connection between 
rossiyskost’ and sovetskost,’ which they interpret in the context 
of the pressure to Russify imposed during certain stages in the 
development of Soviet nationalities policy. 
There are other problems as well. For example, if the sole 
criterion for belonging to the nation is citizenship, how do Rus-
sians abroad fit into this concept? The word ‘compatriot’ is, after 
all, defined in cultural terms, through ‘Russianness’ (russkost’), 
and we are talking about many millions of people here. It is 
clearly impossible to conceive of rossiyskost’ without russkost,’ 
just as ‘British’ cannot be imagined without ‘English’ or ‘French’ 
republicanism without ‘French’ culture. The weaker and less de-
3 Valeriy Aleksandrovich Tishkov, Chto yest’ Rossiya I rossiyskiy narod, Pro 
et Contra, 11 (3), May-June 2007, pp. 21-41; Alexey Ilyich Miller, Debaty o natsii v 
sovremennoy Rossii, Politicheskaya Nauka, 1, 2008, pp. 7-30; Galina Ivanovna Zvere-
va, Kak “nas” teper nazyvat? Formuly kollektivnoi identichnosti v sovremennoi Rossii, 
Vestnik Obschestvennogo Mnenia, 1, January-March 2009, pp. 72-85.
4 Speech of the of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, 
addressed to the deputies of the State Duma, the members of the Federation Coun-
cil, the heads of Russian regions and the representatives of civil society; Moscow, 
Kremlin (March 18, 2014). The speech is fully online: http://www.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/20603.
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veloped the civic component, the more important the cultural 
component is in building a nation. The cultural component also 
becomes more significant whenever a society sees an increase in 
the number of immigrants who do not meet certain cultural ex-
pectations held by the indigenous population.
3. Interpreting rossiyskost’ and russkost’
The answer to the question of whether russkost’ is an alterna-
tive to rossiyskost’ or a necessary supplement to it depends on 
how we interpret russkost.’ Attempts to construe the problem 
in purely philological terms and to propose that russkost’ re-
place rossiyskost’ simply on account of established linguistic 
practice are naïve. If russkost’ is understood as replacing rossiy-
skost,’ that greatly exacerbates the problem confronting the 
numerous citizens of Russia who do not identify themselves 
as Russians. In trying to adjust the meaning of russkiy so that 
it denotes a civic identity common to all Russian citizens, the 
proponents of this viewpoint will encounter no fewer difficul-
ties than those who advocate the affirmation of rossiyskost’ to 
signify a common identity.
At the other pole of thinking about the meaning of russkost,’ 
we see an aspiration, clearly stated in modern discourse, to in-
terpret russkost’ as an ethnic category. Some openly insist on 
a biological, genetic interpretation of russkost.’ The danger of 
this position is obvious, because if it were to be accepted by 
society, it would automatically lead to the question of who is to 
determine whether someone is Russian, of whether DNA analy- 
sis will now replace a pair of compasses for measuring people’s 
skulls, and of how the Nuremberg laws can be rewritten for 
Russia. In practice, echoes of this position can be readily dis-
cerned in our contemporary debate in attempts to denigrate 
opponents as ‘non-Russian.’
The author of this article believes that it is precisely in super-
imposing rossiyskost’ and russkost’ as a form of cultural iden-
tification that we obtain a working ideological construct that 
allows us to take a pragmatic approach to the problems con-
fronting us respecting nation building. Russkost’ as an open cat-
egory offers a strategy of assimilation to all who seek it. At the 
same time, russkost’ cannot be all-embracing, because millions 
of Russian citizens do not want to assimilate or to identify them-
selves as Russians. The concept of the Russian (rossiyskaya) nation 
supports the equality of their civil rights with Russians and 
comfortable coexistence in the same state as Russians.
Russia inherited from the Soviet nationality policy politically 
mobilized ethnic groups, who consider themselves to be nations 
unto themselves and perceive certain autonomous republics as 
their national property. This very fact makes it impossible to 
build a ‘normal’ Russian nation state based on these Soviet ruins. 
We should instead experiment with the concept of ‘state-nation,’ 
which has to be designed so that it would incorporate several 
politically mobilized and territorialized ethnic groups, which 
would never accept the status of ‘normal’ minorities. 
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Chapter IV
Russia as a Xenophobic Empire: Multiethnicity, 
the Nation and the Empire in Russia’s ‘Political Thought’
Marlene Laruelle, IERES, George Washington University
Contemporary Russia displays two relatively contradictory 
positions in the staging of its state identity. On one side, the 
Kremlin states that Russia should be recognized as having a le-
gitimate role in its Eurasian neighborhood: it considers that its 
own national security is potentially threatened by geopolitical 
changes happening in its so-called ‘Near Abroad’ and that its 
great power status and prestige should be based on a recognized 
condition of being a regional hegemon and manifest in its over-
seeing a natural ‘sphere of influence’ in Eurasia. On the other 
side, the Russian population displays high levels of xenophobia 
toward some parts of this very ‘Near Abroad’: if Ukraine and 
Belarus are not considered as ‘foreign,’ and are seen as part of 
the ‘broader Russian’ or ‘Eastern Slavic world,’ the relationship 
to the five Central Asian republics and the three South Cau- 
casian states is much more ambivalent.1 According to the main 
sociological surveys organized by agencies such as the Levada 
Center, VSTIOM, FOM or Romir, about two-thirds of Russians 
can be defined as xenophobic: 2 they consider immigration as 
a danger for their country and for Russian culture, and they 
would like to see the number of migrants from the southern re-
publics of the former Soviet Union drastically reduced, as well 
as the ones already on Russian territory to be expelled en masse.
This ambivalence is visible in the use of the term Eurasia.3 
The notion attained greater visibility largely for want of some-
thing better: it expresses conveniently, and in a rather intuitive 
way, the historical space of Russia in regards to its ‘peripheries,’ 
as well as a certain geopolitical reality. In 2011, when Vladimir 
Putin launched his Eurasian Union project, his speech articu-
lated several dimensions of this intended relationship.4 He pro-
claimed that reintegrating the post-Soviet space under its leader-
ship is Russia’s ‘natural’ geopolitical destiny and that the country 
cannot be denied this vocation. He stated that the European 
Union (EU) has been a successful model to follow and that Rus-
sia should offer an ‘EU-like’ construction to Eurasia, but also in-
creasingly engage in a discourse criticizing liberal principles and 
call on Europe to remember its ‘true’ (read: conservative) values. 
And, last but not least, he accelerated the previous trend of reha-
bilitating Russia’s Soviet and, to a lesser extent, imperial past, in 
the hope that citizens’ pride in their country and its legacy would 
be replicated as support for the regime.
The use of ‘Eurasia’ as a concept to define Russia’s great 
power-ness and its legitimacy in its neighborhood is largely 
shared by both the Putin regime and Russian public opinion. 
However, the Eurasian Union project itself, which declares free 
movement of people among member states, is less consensual. 
Even if the Kremlin holds firmly to its position of favoring a visa- 
free regime inside the Union, most Russians – as well as most 
Russian politicians, including many members of the presidential 
1    Starting from this premise, a country like Moldova can be considered some-
where ‘in the middle.’
2  Theodore P. Gerber, Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian 
Public Opinion, The Washington Quarterly, 37 (3), 2014, pp. 113-134.
3   Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: an Ideology of Empire, Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press & Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C.-Baltimore 2008.
4   This passage emerged in an article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin entitled 
Novyy integratsionnyy proyekt dlya Yevrazii – budushcheye, kotoroye rozhdayetsya 
segodnya (“A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making”), Izve-
stia, 3 October 2011. See Ninu Popescu, Eurasian Union: the real, the imagined, and 
the likely, EUISS Chaillot Papers, 132, 9 September 2014.
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party, United Russia, and officials at the local and regional levels – 
oppose such policies, instead calling for the introduction of a visa 
regime for citizens of Central Asian and South Caucasian states.
How can we comprehend this apparent contradiction? Can 
Russia be a regional hegemon in Eurasia and, in particular, in 
Central Asia while its population is massively in favor of clos-
ing its borders with its southern neighbors? Can Russia revive 
an imperial tradition while being at the same time xenophobic? 
Even if Russia is second only to the United States (maybe third 
if we count the Gulf countries) in the number of migrants that 
cross its borders and work in the country, it still doesn’t promote 
a narrative welcoming immigration, and shares with Europe a 
discourse more reluctant toward it, with similar arguments on 
the need to protect national identities and local citizenry, as well 
as on the limits of national economies to ‘absorb’ migrants. In 
this short paper I do not aim to explain the ambivalent position 
of a ‘xenophobic empire,’ or the legitimacy of this metaphor. 
Rather I address our scholarly toolkits – historical, ideational or 
philosophical, social scientistic – in shedding light on the general 
parameters of a supposed ‘Russian political thought.’
1. Is there a Russian specificity in regards to ‘political thought’?
This first question is a kind of elephant in the room. Not 
only is the term ‘political thought’ fuzzy on its own, but asso-
ciating it to a single country makes its readability even more 
complex. Western scholarship on Russia has always devoted a 
large amount of attention to political thought at once in order 
to explain Russia’s ‘difference’ from the West, but also as part 
of a mirroring game with the Russian tradition of debating the 
existence of a ‘Russian idea,’ very much shaped by Silver Age 
philosophy. Historically, the Western study of political ideas 
in Russia has been mostly promoted alongside an ideological 
agenda of identifying what ‘went wrong’ with the country, from 
late Tsarist chauvinism to Soviet Marxist-Leninism, and today 
with ‘Putinism.’ The study of ‘Russian nationalism,’ intrinsi-
cally linked to the study of Russian political philosophy, has 
become a kind of genre in itself since the Cold War period.5 
The reasons for this focus are grounded in the ways in which 
Soviet Studies were constituted in the West, and especially in 
the United States, but also because even today studying ‘Rus-
sian political thought’ often implies a judgment value as well as 
underlying policy strategies. 
Russia’s ideational evolutions also tend to be systematically 
interpreted in accordance with what they mean for Russia’s 
place on the international scene and its relationship with the 
West. Western scholarship is thus still marked by a prism of 
‘Russian exceptionalism,’ one that was formulated by Russian 
thinkers in the 18th century but that Western scholars have 
since tended to either directly or indirectly reproduce. We are 
still waiting for scholarly works comparing, for instance, Rus-
sian and American messianic traditions – similar in many as-
pects6 – or contemporary xenophobia in Russia and Europe, 7 
or Russian and Western conservatisms. Comparative studies 
5 John Barrett Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1983; Idem. The New Russian Nationalism, 
Praeger, New York 1985; Idem. The New Russian Revolutionaries, Nordland Pub-
lishing Company, Belmont MA 1976; Idem. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1993. See also Alexander Yanov, The Russian 
Challenge and the Year 2000, Basil Blackwell, New York 1987; Idem. The Russian 
New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR, University of Califor-
nia Press, Berkeley 1978; Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred. The Rise of the Extreme 
Right in Russia, HarperCollins, New York 1993.
6 This comparison is only in its infancy. See for instance, among the first, Luke 
March, My Country, Right or Wrong? Comparing Russian and American National-
ism’s Foreign Policy Manifestations, Centenary Conference of Slavic Studies, Leiden 
University, 11 October 2013.
7 See Marlene Laruelle, Eurasianism and European Far Right: Reshaping the 
Europe-Russia Relationship, Lexington, Lanham MD 2015.
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would help us address this metaphor of a ‘xenophobic empire’ 
as well as reduce the risk of analyzing how political ideas de-
velop in Russia in isolation from its international context, as if 
Russia was a kind of close world, distinct from the rest of us. 
What is ‘national’ and what is ‘globalized’ in Russia’s current 
political trajectory?
2. Are historical parallels helpful?
In a second move, I am interested in addressing here the issue 
of using historical parallels to explain what is going on in Rus-
sia today, based on the indemonstrable assumption that some 
historical patterns have shaped the Russian society so deeply 
that they tend to repeat.
Historically, Russia’s national identity has been built around 
two main issues: its relationship with Europe (i.e. is Russia part 
of Europe? Part of Asia? Straddling both worlds? Separate from 
both?) and the relationship between the state and its popula-
tion (i.e. is Russia a nation-state, an empire, or a multinational 
federation?). The Tsarist Empire was not founded on a unified 
pattern of integration: conquered ethnic groups were given 
different status depending on the way their elite negotiated 
with the Russian authorities, and on the perception of their 
status on a ‘civilizational’ scale, i.e. as civilized versus archaic 
peoples. The Russian authorities requested political loyalty and 
submission to their hierarchy of values and elites (“Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy, and Nationality”). Some populations were largely 
granted cultural autonomy while others were more repressed. 
The Soviet Union, while functioning under different politi- 
cal assumptions, still maintained a diversity of approaches: 
depending of the historical period and of the concerned ethnic 
groups, some were ‘lucky’ to benefit from indigenization 
processes (mostly peoples considered by the Russian elites as 
backward and remote), while others saw repeated destruction 
of their elite alongside mass deportations (mostly people of the 
Western regions of the Soviet Union, and the Jews). The Soviet 
regime balanced celebrating the ‘friendship of peoples,’ with 
popular conceptions that, on the one hand, Russians were pay-
ing a heavy price for bringing civilization and development to 
backward republics, and, on the other, that asserting the primus 
inter pares role of ethnic Russians and promoting some policies 
that can be defined as ‘colonial.’8
How do these historical patterns help us address the con-
temporary paradox of reclaiming an imperial tradition while 
still maintaining complaints about cultural and ethnic ‘mixity’ 
among some of the former Soviet citizens? If historical patterns 
are useful, how then do we assess not only the continuities but 
the ruptures, the gaps, the temporal fragmentations, and the 
transformations? 
3. Do we need a sociology of actors and places of production?
As a third point to be addressed, I argue that we do not yet have 
enough scholarly tools to discuss ‘Russian political thought’ 
because we lack a sociology of its creators and places of pro-
duction. Historically, the study of ‘Russian political thought’ 
came from the field of political philosophy and focused on 
ideas, concepts, their intellectual legacies and logical orders. 
We are thus still lacking a sociology of Russian intellectual 
life and an ‘ecology’ of the places of its production – universi- 
ties, academy of sciences, journals and newspapers, internet 
world(s), think tanks, etc. 
8 See Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the 
Making of the Soviet Union, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2005; Terry Martin, 
The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-
1939, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2001. Ronald Grigor Suny & Terry Martin 
(eds.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.
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Ideologies are often fuzzy and shifting, and say nothing 
about personal strategies, institutional statuses, and networks 
of their producers or funders. Ideological typologies remain 
sterile if they are not combined with a more sociological 
approach to the strategies employed by each group to speak to 
their constituency and to impact the political or cultural arena. 
We see this in studies of contemporary Russian national-
ism that often hope for an easy mapping of where ‘nationalism’ 
is and where it is not. Studies tend to look for one ‘national- 
ist voice’ and thus lose themselves in debating whether it 
comes from the Kremlin and shapes society or whether, on the 
contrary, it comes from society and influences the Kremlin, 
or whether far-right movements set the tone and the Kremlin 
adopts it. This analysis presents these problems as analogous to 
the tropic dilemma of the chicken and the egg. Nationalism is 
polyphonic, and voices are multiple: the Kremlin-backed offi-
cial production; para-official voices such as the Moscow Patri-
archate and official think tanks; political opposition from the 
‘Communists’ to the ‘Liberals’; the regions and the republics; 
the media world, such as the famous publishers of the publitsi- 
stika; academia, and the world of arts and literature.9
If Russia presents the paradox of an ‘xenophobic empire’ it 
is probably because those promoting the xenophobic arguments 
and those defending the imperial ones came from diverging 
groups, with their distinct ideological traditions, gurus, funders, 
and places of production. Hence the need for a collective work 
that could map ‘who thinks what’ in Russia to help us avoid pro-
jecting a unified and monolithic ideological landscape.10
4. Does cultural anthropology give us some keys?
I follow the previous point by adding that cultural anthropol-
ogy, which has offered us the most innovative approaches to 
post-Soviet Russia, may offer some new tools to comprehend 
this ‘xenophobic empire.’ We know for instance that universal-
ist discourses that imply an in-principle rejection of discrimina-
tion are poorly diffused in Russia. The ‘friendship of peoples’ 
concept was, and is still today, not based on universal princi-
ples but rather on an idea of a common historical destiny that 
brought together the peoples of the Eurasian space to coexist 
while still respecting their national individuality. This vaunted 
tolerance is therefore not seen as an abstraction, but is assumed 
to be a historical fact unique to Russia. As Mischa Gabowitsch 
persuasively explained.
The anti-racist or anti-nationalist message […] is never understood as 
a universalist message of total neutrality toward nationality and skin 
color: it is always meant to highlight the hospitality of the Russian (or 
Soviet) people, who welcome the outsiders despite their otherness.11
Multinationalism as vaunted by the Russian authorities and 
supported by the public opinion is an ontologized, essential-
ized one: it believes in national entities as natural. Hence, the 
exclusion of North-Caucasians and of migrants from the narra-
tive of Russian citizenry, while Tatars and Siberian populations 
are celebrated as examples of the Eurasian ‘melting-pot.’ To this 
can be added the memory of WWII in Russia, which is read as 
a patriotic war against an historical enemy invading the country, 
and not as a war against an extremist ideology calling for mass 
extermination.12   This perception, widespread in Russia thought 
9 For a longer discussion, see Marlene Laruelle, Russkiy natsionalizm kak 
oblast’’ nauchnykh issledovaniy, (“Russian nationalism as an object of research”), 
Pro et Contra, 18 (1-2), January-April 2014, pp. 54-72.
10 See Pål Kolstø & Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), The New Russian Nationalism: 
Between Imperial and Ethnic, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2016.
1 1 Mischa Gabowitsch, Le Spectre du fascisme. Le nationalisme russe et ses ad-
versaires, 1987-2007, PhD dissertation, EHESS, Paris 2007, p. 119.
1 2 Elizabeth Wood, Performing Memory: Vladimir Putin and the Celebration of 
World War II in Russia, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 38, 2011, pp. 172-200.
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as well as school textbooks, official commemorations and family 
narratives, drastically shaped the cultural acceptance of some 
racist or ethnicized patterns, which partly explains the ‘xeno-
phobic empire’ posture.
To conclude, I would like to thank the organizers of this work-
shop for re-opening a long-awaited discussion about Russia’s 
‘political thought’ and allowing us to move away from a short- 
sighted analysis focused on Putin’s own personality and on a 
supposed monolithic political and intellectual life. Many of 
these misinterpretations are based on the lack of scholarly tools 
and analyses able to give us a more complex picture of Russia’s 
current evolution.
Chapter V
War and its Impact on Politics and Political Thought
Mark Kramer, Harvard University
A statement about war often attributed to Leon Trotsky – “you 
may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you” – 
is apocryphal, but whoever first said it understood the link 
between politics and war very well. The literature on war and 
state-building, including the work of Charles Tilly, Joel Migdal, 
William McNeill, Samuel E. Finer, Ronald Cohen, Barry Buzan, 
Miguel Centeno, Christopher Clapham, Mohammed Ayoob, 
Linda Colley, Rolf Schwarz, Kalevi Holsti, and Jeffrey Herbst 
among many others, underscores the variegated impact of war 
on politics both domestically and internationally.1 Wars alter 
power balances among key political and social elites, bring to 
the fore certain sectors of the economy, arouse nationalist and 
militaristic sentiments, facilitate infringements of civil liberties 
and political repression, and – in the case of disastrously unsuc-
cessful war efforts – spawn recriminations against those respon-
sible for the wars, potentially culminating in large-scale social 
upheaval and the downfall of governments.
1 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Black-
well, Oxford 1990; Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, 
in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, & Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State 
Back In, Cambridge University Press, New York 1985, pp. 169-191; Joel S. Migdal, 
Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1988; William H. McNeill, The 
Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 1982; Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role 
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1. Russia’s wars and the others’ conflicts after 1991
War is a crucial topic in understanding politics and political 
thought in post-Soviet Russia, a country that has taken part 
– to one degree or another – in nine wars and several smaller 
conflicts since 1991. Russian forces were involved in four civil 
wars in other former Soviet republics in the 1992-1994 period 
– Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Moldova (Transnis-
tria), and Tajikistan – and then fought two highly destructive 
wars (1994-1996, 1999-2009) to keep Chechnya within the 
Russian Federation.2 In August 2008, Russian military forces 
crushed the much smaller Georgian army and completed the 
de facto removal of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia. 
In late February and March 2014, Russian military forces occu-
pied Crimea without bloodshed and facilitated the annexation 
of the peninsula by the Russian government. Soon thereafter 
Russian forces began supporting pro-Russian insurgent groups 
in eastern Ukraine, giving rise to a destructive civil war there 
– a war that continues to this day.3 Most recently, in Septem-
ber 2015, the Russian authorities dispatched Russian combat 
aircraft and troops to Syria to prop up the faltering regime of 
Bashar al-Assad against a variety of rebel groups.4 The ensu-
ing Russian bombing campaign in Syria, aimed at supporting 
a Syrian Army ground offensive, marked the first time that 
Russian forces engaged in military operations outside the ter-
ritory of the former USSR. In addition to the wars in which 
Russia has taken part over the past 25 years, wars fought by 
other countries, especially the United States, have also had a 
far-reaching impact on political thought in Russia, mostly to 
the detriment of those who support democracy, human rights, 
and international law. In particular, the war undertaken by the 
United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization (NATO) against Serbia in the spring of 1999, includ-
ing a bombing campaign over Serbia that killed more than 500 
civilians, sparked deep anti-NATO and anti-U.S. sentiment 
in Russia, marginalizing those who had previously advocated 
close ties with the West.5 Similarly, the U.S-led war in Iraq in 
the spring of 2003 put a decisive end to the partial rapproche-
ment between Russia and the West that followed the September 
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of the Military in Politics, Praeger, New York 1962; Brian D. Taylor & Roxana Botea, 
Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World, Inter-
national Studies Review, 10 (1), March 2008, pp. 27-56; Bruce D. Porter, War and 
the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics, The Free Press, 
New York 1994; Ronald Cohen, Warfare and State Formation: Wars Make States and 
States Make Wars, in Brian R. Ferguson (ed.), Warfare, Culture, and Environment, 
Academic Press, Orlando 1984, pp. 329-358; Barry Buzan & George Lawson, The 
Global Transformation: History, Modernity, and the Making of International Rela-
tions, Cambridge University Press, New York 2015; Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood 
and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America, Pennsylvania State University 
Press, University Park 2003; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, The 
Free Press, New York 1991; Christopher S. Clapham, Africa and the International 
System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge University Press, New York 1996; 
Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Region-
al Conflict, and the International System, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1995; 
Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 3rd ed., Yale University Press, 
New Haven 2009; Rolf Schwarz, War and State Building in the Middle East, Univer-
sity Press of Florida, Gainesville 2012; Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and Abra-
mo Fimo Kenneth Organski, The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent 
Creation of Order, American Political Science Review, 75 (4), December 1981, pp. 
901-910; Karen Barkley, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Cen-
tralization, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1997; Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and 
the State of War, Cambridge University Press, New York 1996; and Jeffrey Herbst, 
War and the State in Africa, International Security, 14 (4), Spring 1990, pp. 117-139.
2 Varvara Igorevna Blishchenko & Mayya Mikhaylovna Solntseva (eds.), Kri-
zisy i konflikty na postsovetskom prostranstve, Aspekt Press, Moscow 2014.
  3 For a solid overview of the military conflict from the spring of 2014 through 
the summer of 2015, see Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Exhaustion, 
Survival, 57 (5), September-October 2015, pp. 77-106.
  4 On the risks posed by Russia’s intervention in Syria, see Irek Murtazin, Sirii-
skaya lovushka: Rossiya ne dolzhna zastryat’ na Blizhnem Vostoke, Novaya Gazeta, 8 
October 2015, p. 1.
  5  Vladimir Brovkin, Discourse on NATO in Russia during the Kosovo War, Demo- 
kratizatsiya, 7 (4), Fall 1999, pp. 544-560. See also Oksana Antonenko, Russia and 
the Deadlock over Kosovo, Working Paper n° 21, Russia/NIS Center, Paris, July 2007.
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2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.6 The prolonged 
U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq that followed the 
invasion, and the escalating war in Afghanistan after U.S. forces 
failed to prevent the Taliban from regrouping, further strained 
East-West ties. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 differed 
from the Kosovo and Iraq wars insofar as it was authorized by 
the United Nations (UN) Security Council (a move that Putin 
openly opposed but that President Dmitry Medvedev decided 
to approve), but Russian leaders quickly surmised that NATO 
had misled the Security Council about its true intentions and 
was using the campaign to overthrow the regime of Muammar 
Gaddafi and bring to power a government that favored the West.7 
The U.S. government’s willingness to act outside interna-
tional law in 1999 and 2003 (among other occasions) has been 
cited by the Russian authorities as a rationalization for Russia’s 
own repeated violations of the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of neighboring states. Russian President Vladimir Putin 
seems to believe that the West’s bad behavior – but not its good 
behavior – is worth emulating and that Russia should be praised 
for doing so. Oddly enough, Putin himself had actually warned 
against this phenomenon in early 2008 when he denounced 
Kosovo’s imminent declaration of independence as “illegal, 
ill-conceived, and immoral” and accused NATO and the Euro-
pean Union (EU) of “double standards.” He emphasized that 
he and other Russian officials did not intend to “act like fools. 
If someone makes an illegal and ill-conceived decision [about 
Kosovo], it does not mean that we should act the same way” in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.8 Just six months later, however, 
Putin decided to do exactly what he had warned against. 
To be sure, even if NATO had not forcibly intervened in Serbia 
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in 1999 and spearheaded independence for Kosovo nine years 
later – a step that Western governments depicted as a “unique 
case” that would not set a precedent for other separatist 
conflicts around the world – Putin might well have proceeded 
with independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the wake 
of the August 2008 war. But, at a minimum, Western policy 
concerning Kosovo gave Putin a convenient pretext and ratio- 
nalization for his actions.
2. The political dimension of the Second Chechen War
Both the internal and the external wars in which Russia has 
been involved since 1991 have affected politics and political 
thought in Moscow. There is not sufficient space here to cover 
this phenomenon fully, so I will simply highlight a few crucial 
points about the Putin era. The prosecution of the second war 
in Chechnya by Putin (initially as prime minister and then as 
president) not only enabled him to consolidate immense power 
in Russia but also transformed the nature of Russian politics, as 
reflected in the curtailment of political debate and political com-
petition, the reassertion of state control over key media outlets, 
the recentralization of political administrative arrangements, 
and the increasing personalization of executive authority.9 War- 
making over the centuries has both necessitated and resulted in 
a huge increase in the power of the state. The impact in Russia 
of the second Chechen war illustrated this dynamic very well, 
 6 See Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin, 
Knopf, New York 2015, pp. 203-262.
 7 Ibid., pp. 379-400.
8 The full transcript of Putin’s Annual Great Press Conference, (“Ezhegodnaya 
bol’shaya press-konferentsiya”), Moscow, 14 February 2008 is online: http://kremlin.
ru/events/president/transcripts/24835. See also Vladimir Putin, Nam vsegda govoryat: 
Kosovo – osobyi sluchai. Vran’e eto vse, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 14 February 2008, p. 1.
9 See Mark Kramer, Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism 
in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 57 (2), March 2005, pp. 209-292.
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though I should note that the impact also was driven by the spe-
cific political circumstances in Russia under Putin.
From 2001 to 2005, Chechen fighters resorted to many 
large-scale terrorist attacks against Russian civilians outside the 
North Caucasus. One would have assumed that these incidents, 
particularly the numerous suicide bombings in Moscow that 
killed hundreds of civilians, as well as the massacre in Beslan in 
September 2004 that killed nearly 340 (more than half of whom 
were schoolchildren), would have generated a sustained public 
debate about the goals and nature of the war. After all, opinion 
polls conducted by the Levada Center revealed that by 2003 
more than 80 percent of Russians feared that they or their 
relatives “might fall victim to terrorist attacks,” and by 2004 
that figure had risen to 90 percent.10 The financial costs of the 
conflict, and the high death toll among Russian troops (com-
parable until 2005 to the number of Soviet soldiers killed each 
year in the 1980s in Afghanistan, a country that is forty times 
larger than Chechnya in land area and thirty times larger in 
population), would presumably have given further grounds for 
a vigorous public debate. Yet no meaningful public discussion 
about the war occurred at any point, nor was any senior offi-
cial held accountable for misjudgments and blunders in pros-
ecuting the war. Chechnya played no role in either the Russian 
parliamentary elections of December 2003 or the Russian pres-
idential election of March 2004, and it was not on the political 
agenda afterward, apart from a brief flurry of concern and re-
criminations following the Beslan massacre. The war was never 
discussed in any depth on Russian television or in the Russian 
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parliament (which held no hearings about the war even when 
terrorist attacks were at their peak), and the coverage of it on 
the television news was sporadic and highly tendentious.
The lack of public debate about the second Chechen war 
was a notable departure from the experience in Russia during 
the first war, which began in December 1994 and continued 
until August 1996. That earlier conflict was unpopular from 
the start and was sharply criticized on Russian television, parti- 
cularly the independent NTV station. The issue came up repeat-
edly during the 1996 Russian presidential election campaign 
(albeit mainly as part of a general indictment of the govern-
ment’s incompetence), and pressure mounted on President 
Boris Yeltsin for a political settlement.11 By contrast, during 
the second war, the Russian public was much more ambiva-
lent and fatalistic in its reactions. Even though opinion polls in 
2003, 2004, and 2005 revealed that the vast majority of Russians 
believed that the war would drag on incessantly and would 
inspire further terrorist attacks, they did not take to the streets 
in protest or seek to form an organized movement that would 
press for an end to the fighting. Nor did they support calls for 
much more drastic repressive measures (e.g., mass deporta-
tions) that would “end the Chechen problem once and for all.”12 
Throughout the war, the Russian electorate seemed content to 
have the government continue with its protracted counterinsur-
gency/counterterrorist campaign regardless of the costs.
10 See, for example, Levada-Tsentr, Chechnya posle A. Maskhadova, ATsYuL, 
Moscow, March 2005; Idem., Rossiyane o smerti Aslana Maskhadova, ATsYuL, 
Moscow, 24 March 2005; and VTsIOM (Vserossiiskii Tsentr Izucheniya Obschest-
vennogo Mneniya), Bor’ba s terrorizmom: God posle Beslana, Press-Vypusk, n° 281, 
Moscow, 30 August 2005; as well as many surveys conducted in 2004 by the Le-
vada-tsentr, VTsIOM, and Fond obschestvennogo mneniya (FOM).
11 Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, New 
York University Press, New York 1998; Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: 
Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?, Brookings Institution Press, Washing-
ton D.C. 2002, pp. 11-45; and Tracey C. German, Russia’s Chechen War, Routledge 
Curzon, New York 2003, pp. 49, 61, 70-73.
12 Prominent members of the Rodina party, notably Dmitry Rogozin, raised 
the prospect of mass deportations, but did not gain any public backing for such 
measures. See the interview Beseda s Dmitriem Rogozinym on Apel’sinskii sok, NTV 
television station, 8 February 2004, 12:15 p.m. (Moscow time). See also MN, Zaya- 
vlenie partii ‘Rodina,’ Moskovskie Novosti, 10 September 2004, p. 7.
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In the absence of public debate and high-level accountabil-
ity, the war served as the pretext for a major recentralization of 
political authority in Russia, notably in September 2004 when 
President Putin cited the Beslan massacre as justification for his 
decision to eliminate direct elections for regional governors and 
to do away with single-member district elections for the Russian 
parliament.13 These actions were conducive to Putin’s political 
agenda, but they had no bearing on the underlying regional 
dynamic in the North Caucasus, with the spread of the conflict 
beyond Chechnya’s borders. Even as the war was winding down 
in Chechnya in 2006-2007, it was taking an ever deadlier toll 
in neighboring regions and wreaking havoc in both Ingushe-
tia and Dagestan, with some repercussions elsewhere as well. 
The growing regionalization of the war from 2002 on meant 
that an end to warfare in Chechnya itself – Putin’s primary goal 
– did not ultimately bring greater stability to the North Cau- 
casus as a whole. When Chechen fighters were forced to abandon 
their guerrilla war at home, they moved into Ingushetia and 
Dagestan and linked up with radical Islamic groups in those 
regions. The result was wider instability and convulsions in 
the North Caucasus even as Chechnya proper was pacified 
under the iron-fisted rule of Ramzan Kadyrov. The situation has 
been further complicated by the impact of external conflicts. 
In recent years, Chechen and Dagestani jihadists have traveled 
to Syria (and subsequently to Iraq) to fight on behalf of radi-
cal Islamic groups affiliated with al Qaeda and Islamic State. 
The prospective return of these battle-hardened jihadists to the 
North Caucasus poses a host of potential dangers for Russian 
society and Putin’s regime.14
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3. The political impact of the ‘external wars’
The three external wars in which Russia has been involved – 
officially or unofficially – in the aftermath of the second war in 
Chechnya have also been notable for a lack of any meaningful 
public debate. In the case of the August 2008 war with Georgia, 
the near-universal consensus in support of the war was un-
doubtedly attributable to the rapid and decisive outcome of the 
fighting – a situation that in many countries is apt to generate 
overwhelming public approval. Much the same is true about 
Putin’s decisive use of force in early 2014 to sever Crimea from 
Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia – all without any loss of 
life. The few individuals in Russia who condemned the move 
as an act of conquest and aggression, such as Boris Nemtsov, 
gained no traction among the Russian public on this matter 
apart from a few liberal intellectuals.
Nevertheless, events in Ukraine that have followed Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea are not quite as easily explicable. 
Despite overwhelming evidence that the Russian government 
has been fueling the internal conflict in eastern Ukraine and 
that Russian soldiers who are operating without identifying 
insignia have taken part in certain large-scale operations on be-
half of the pro-Russian insurgents (particularly at key moments 
in August 2014 and February 2015), the Levada Center’s polls 
have consistently shown that some 80 to 90 percent of Russians 
do not believe that Russia has been involved in any way.15 To be 
sure, even if a majority of Russians did believe that Russia was 
directly or indirectly taking part in the conflict, they might well 
be supportive of that role. The “rally around the flag” effect is 
13 Vladimir Gelman, Vozvraschenie Leviafana? Politika retsentralizatsii v 
sovremennoi Rossii, Polis, 2, 2006, pp. 15-32; and Paul Goode, Russia’s Guberna-
torial Elections: A Postmortem, in Julie Newton & William Tompson (eds.), Insti-
tutions, Ideas, and Leadership in Russian Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 
2010, pp. 43-66.
14 See Mark Kramer, The Return of Islamic State Fighters: The Impact on the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo n° 381, Elliott School of 
International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington D.C., August 2015.
15 Levada-Tsentr, Vospriyatie sobytii na vostoke Ukrainy i sanktsii, ATsYuL, 
Moscow, 31 August 2015. 
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a powerful catalyst of support not only in Russia but in almost 
all large countries. Even so, the very fact that the vast majority 
of Russians do not believe that Russia has been either directly 
or indirectly involved in eastern Ukraine is a sign of how thor-
oughly Putin has circumscribed the leeway for political debate 
about fundamental matters of war and peace. Even such issues 
as the deaths and capture of Russian soldiers in Ukraine have 
not generated anything close to meaningful public discussion. 
Activists and relatives of soldiers who have tried to raise the 
issue are at risk of being accused of disclosing state secrets or 
of engaging in ‘extremism,’ and scholars at Russian universities 
and research centers who have publicly criticized the war have 
been ostracized and fired.
A similar dynamic has been evident with Russia’s military 
operations in Syria. In September 2015, just days before Putin 
ordered the use of Russian troops in Syria, the Levada Center’s 
polling indicated that only a small minority of Russians were 
paying any attention to Syria and that an even smaller minor- 
ity believed that Russian troops should intervene in Syria.16 But 
Putin, having sensed that Assad’s regime was on the verge of 
being overthrown, decided to act regardless. Without any pub-
lic debate or hearings in the Russian parliament, he authorized 
the deployment of combat forces and the start of the bombing 
campaign. Immediately, public opinion shifted overwhelmin 
gly in his favor, not least because every news broadcast on state- 
controlled television offered heroic depictions of Russian 
bombing raids. The broadcasters made no attempt to confirm 
the briefing materials they received and instead simply echoed 
the official line that “the precision with which strikes are being 
inflicted [by Russian combat aircraft] shows that we now have 
achieved a situation better than that attained by the American- 
16 Idem., Voina v Sirii: Vnimanie, otsenki, IGIL, ATsYuL, Moscow, 28 Septem-
ber 2015.
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led coalition.”17 Some Russian bloggers challenged and debun- 
ked this line on the Internet, but the only thing that mattered 
was the depiction on state-controlled television, which under 
Putin has become the exclusive news source for some 90 percent 
of Russians. All the national television broadcasts conveyed a 
uniformly rosy picture of the Russian bombing campaign.
4. Enforcing authoritarianism through war
The manipulation of public opinion about Russia’s involve-
ment in Syria was also seen in the public’s misperceptions of 
the goals of the military campaign. Putin had made clear from 
the outset that his overriding goal in Syria was to “stabilize the 
legitimate authority” (i.e., Assad’s regime), but this was not the 
impression given to the public by Russia’s state-controlled tele-
vision.18 Instead, the news broadcasts led people to believe that 
Russian was intervening primarily to combat Islamic State ter-
rorists. The fact that the Russian Defense Ministry’s own charts 
showed that none of the Russian combat aircraft in the initial 
weeks had actually flown sorties over the vast swathes of terri-
tory held by Islamic State apparently made no difference to a 
public that had become accustomed to embracing every word 
from on high about fundamental questions of war and peace. 
The public was not so submissive in the 1990s, but one of the 
defining features of the Putin era has been the elimination of 
structures that ensured public scrutiny of military operations, 
17 These statements, almost word for word, were featured in numerous news 
broadcasts on the Rossiya station and Pervyi kanal station on 11 and 12 October 
2015, as I witnessed firsthand.
18 Vladimir Putin’s interview Putin v eksklyuzivnom interv’yu: Rossiya miro- 
lyubiva, samodostatochna i ne boitsya terroristov, on the Voskresnyi vecher program, 
Rossiya television, 11 October 2015, is online: http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id 
=2673998#.
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Chapter VI
State Militarism as a Basis for Russian Identity
Alexander Golts, Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal
1. Russian Militarism: features and trends
The ideology of Russian militarism – which is precisely what 
hides behind the euphemistic term ‘defense consciousness’ – 
turned out to be far more tenacious than the Communist ide-
ology, and it continues to permeate Russian society as a whole. 
To this day, Russian citizens, including those who see them-
selves as the intellectual elite, become misty-eyed at the sight of 
the parade ‘boxes’ marching in Prussian ‘goose step.’ What is 
even worse, the majority of citizens are convinced that the state 
has every right to demand of them huge sacrifices in the name 
of the said defense capability. 
Over a period of three hundred years, with a few breaks be-
tween (1860-1880, 1905-1914, 1925-1935, 1987-present), the 
primary, if not the sole, objective for the Russian state has 
been to maintain a mastodontic military machine.1 This kind of 
resulting in a lack of public accountability and a free hand for 
the authorities to act at will.
Thus, over the past 16 years, wars in which Russia has taken 
part and wars fought by Western countries have contributed 
a great deal to the increasing authoritarianism in Russia and 
the drastically circumscribed leeway for political thought. War 
in many countries has tended to impede wide-ranging public 
debate and to deter people from openly questioning the official 
line – conditions that are certainly evident in Russia. If Russia 
continues to fight wars in the future as often as it has up to 
now, authoritarian retrenchment under Putin will be further 
solidified and will be much more difficult for future genera-
tions to overcome.
1 See William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914, The Free 
Press, New York 1992; William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, Yale 
University Press, New Haven 1998; Alexander A. Svechin, Strategiya, Voyennyy 
Vestnik, Moskva 1927; Brian Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military 
Relations 1689-2000, Cambridge University Press, New York 2003; John P. Moran, 
From Garrison State to Nation State: The Russian Military and Political Power under 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Praeger, Westport 2001; Dietrich Geyer, Russian imperial-
ism: the interaction of domestic and foreign policy, 1860-1914, Yale University Press, 
New Haven 1987.
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state strives to control everything and everyone; it diminishes, 
if not does away with, the role of civil society and private life. 
The word ‘militarism’ characterizes this kind of state best. 
German Historian Gerhard Ritter, speaking on German mil-
itarism, for instance, observes that some of its fundamental 
characteristics are, first, that all important political decisions 
are based on military-technological calculations, rather than 
on a comprehensive analysis from the perspective of national 
interests, and second, that the military approach absolutely 
dominates the nations way of dealing with various problems.2 
In his book, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, 
Alfred Vagts describes the civilian aspects of militarism as 
the unquestioning embrace of military values, ethos, principles, [and] 
attitudes; as ranking military institutions and considerations above 
all others in the state; as finding the heroic predominantly in military 
service and action including war – to the preparation of which the 
nation’s main interest and recourses must be dedicated, with the inevi-
tability and goodness of war always presumed. Such high regard leads 
to the advocacy of applying military values, organization – notably hi-
erarchical features – to the totality of a nation’s life. 3
Attending these values, Vagts argues, is “contempt for civil-
ian politics”4 shared by members of the military, as well as by 
government officials and the public.
No one could deny that Russia has exhibited the afore-
mentioned qualities. Just as was the case for Peter the Great, 
Russia’s military needs prompted the construction of roads and 
canals, Joseph Stalin explained that the industrialization was 
necessary if the Socialist motherland were to be able to defend 
itself from its enemies. “We are fifty to a hundred years behind 
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the developed countries. We need to cover this distance within 
a matter of ten years. Either we do it, or they will destroy us.”5 
The Brezhnev administration, too, claimed that the construc-
tion of the Baikal-Amur Highway was necessary for the coun-
try’s security in the East.
For three centuries, each respective Russian government 
was interested in its subjects as potential soldiers and as sup-
pliers of financial and material resources necessary to maintain 
huge armed forces. For three centuries, the foundation of the 
Russian Army was not the officer corps, but a badly trained 
mass of rank-and-file men, whose power relied on the fact that 
they could be continuously replaced. The same unique feature 
of Russian military culture, which has penetrated every pore of 
society, helps explain why Russians have such an ambivalent 
attitude towards the military. The draft service coexists in Rus-
sia with the regular army. For the majority of the population, 
military service has never been a freely chosen occupation in-
stead it has been the most burdensome of all state obligations. 
The three-century old custom of coercion has produced some 
rather particular folk mentalities. On the one hand, no one dis-
putes the government’s right to draft people into the army and to 
be in control of their lives, despite bearing no responsibility for 
their deaths. On the other hand, society does not condemn those 
who use any means at their disposal to evade the military service. 
2. The Mobilizing politics
A protracted and painful process of disintegration of the mili-
tary system of ‘mobilization’ took place in Russia between the 
years 1991-2008. The system has considerably deeper historical 2 Constantin P. Danopoulos & Cynthia A. Watson (eds.), The Political Role of 
the Military: An International Handbook, Greenwood Press, Westport 1996, p. 143.
3 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, Meridian, New 
York 1959, p. 13.
4 Ibidem.
5 Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma, XI edition, Gosudarstveinnoe Izdatel’stvo Nauk, 
Moskva 1947, p. 329.
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roots than any other relic of the Soviet and Russian past. This 
accounts for the resistance of the Russian military system to any 
attempts to reform it. In the public conscience of our nation, 
there is simply no other, non-compulsory form of military orga- 
nization, so society perceives this Moloch that robs hundreds 
of young men of their lives and futures as an unavoidable evil. 
The second Russian president Vladimir Putin fully exhi- 
bits the features of civilian militarists, as they were described by 
Alfred Vagts: unconditional preference for “war values, man-
ners, principles and relations” and “a deep contempt for civil 
politics, the institution of elections, parliamentarism, and polit-
ical parties.” 6 The war was the powerful catalyst that propelled 
Putin to power. In fact, Russian voters – frightened by the 
invasion by gangs of Chechen militants into Dagestan and the 
subsequent terrorist attacks, explosions of houses in Moscow 
and Volgodonsk – hastened the support for the one who 
promised to provide security and vowed to make it simple and 
justifiable with the support of military force. The Russian presi-
dent demonstrated a sincere love for the parade and the heroic 
life of the Armed Forces. From the outset of his occupation of 
the Kremlin, Putin began to build so called ‘vertical power.’ 
Therefore, Putin is sure that the best management model for 
Russia could be a hierarchical system like the military one. 
On the top of the pyramid stands the president – who is also 
the commander in chief – and below – level by level – exec- 
utive and dedicated officials, capable of carrying the will of the 
‘supreme leader’ to each and every corner of the vast country.
In fact, the introduction of this system means that power 
in Russia is still built on the military-feudal principle and the 
power reigns held by the present ruler. The entire practice of 
Putin’s regime, which brought down the parliament and the 
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judicial authorities to the role of ‘puppets,’ shows that the prin-
ciple of division of powers is seen as a sort of ‘heresy,’ and the 
principle of unity of command and near supreme authority is 
also extended to the political system of the state.
3. The external elements
In this logical system, any crisis is seen as the result of hostile 
forces who want to disarm Russia. This has been most clearly 
demonstrated in Putin’s response to Beslan. On that occasion, he 
blamed external forces that were allegedly helping terrorists: in 
his words, “they help, believing that Russia – as one of the largest 
nuclear powers in the world – is a threat. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to eliminate this threat. And terrorism – is, of course, just a 
tool to achieve these goals.”7 He continued to declare almost the 
same thing for the next ten years, explaining the conflict with the 
West as a consequence of its desire to disarm Russia:
You know, at the Valdai [International Discussion] Club, I gave an ex-
ample of our most recognizable symbol. It is a bear protecting his tai-
ga. You see, if we continue the analogy, sometimes I think that maybe 
it would be best if our bear just sat still. Maybe he should stop chasing 
pigs and boars around the taiga but start picking berries and eating 
honey. Maybe then he will be left alone. But no, he won’t be! Because 
someone will always try to chain him up. As soon as he’s chained they 
will tear out his teeth and claws. In this analogy, I am referring to the 
power of nuclear deterrence. As soon as – God forbid – it happens 
and they no longer need the bear, the taiga will be taken over.8
6 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, Meridian, New 
York 1959, p. 453.
7 Putin’s declaration after Beslan tragedy (4 September 2004) is online: http://
www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/04/1752_type63374type82634_76320.shtml.
8 Reid Standish & Elias Groll, Putin Says Russian Bear Isn’t About to Sit Back 
and Just Eat Berries and Honey, Foreign Policy, 18 December 2014, is online: http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/18/putin-says-russian-bear-isnt-about-to-sit-back-and-
just-eat-berries-and-honey/.
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Those 1,500 nuclear warheads – that Moscow now has – 
turn in Vladimir Putin’s eyes into the only factor that equates 
Russia with the United States, the most potent world power, 
and keeps them on a level playing field. This can explain why 
the Kremlin has so painfully perceived the US withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty 1972 and the US intention to deploy a 
missile defense system. The ABM Treaty was a unique interna-
tional document, which stated that there was a state capable of 
destroying the United States, and, moreover, that the United 
States have to put up with this fact. 
These militarist stereotypes have a decisive impact on Rus-
sian policy in the post-Soviet space. The logic of Moscow’s 
actions in Ukraine and Georgia is explained by the certainty that 
the rapprochement of these countries to the West will inevitably 
turn the arrival of the ‘NATO bases.’ As a result, the Kremlin 
is embroiled in a lengthy and pointless conflict, remaining in 
a serious styate of international isolation. Another sign of the 
militarist mindset of the Russian government of its ‘securitiza-
tion.’ The secret side of any activity seems the only important. 
Any public information is seen as specially prepared disinfor-
mation. This situation, inevitably leads, at best, to narrowing 
channels of information, and at worst – an inadequate percep- 
tion of it. As a result, unverified rumors are brought to the 
attention of the head of state. At the same time, no one pays 
attention to very important processes taking place in plain sight.
4. Reforming the mobilizing system
For three years (2008-2011), Russia underwent the most radical 
military reforms experienced in the past 150 years. As a result 
of a dramatic reduction of the officer corps and the elimination 
of skeleton units (about 80 percent of all ground forces), Rus-
sia effectively abandoned the concept of a mass mobilization 
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army. My initial theory was that rejection of the concept of mass 
mobilization army in the long term meant a radical change in 
the relationship between the Russian citizen and Russian state. 
The rejection of mass mobilization threatened to destroy the 
entire system of ‘ideological’ government. The rejection threat-
ened to destroy all systems of state militarism, which is a seem-
ingly strong basis for Russian national identity. However, the 
results were astonishing. The State disposed of the concept 
mass mobilization, but it’s wastages kept enough power to sup-
port and sustain state militarism. It would seem that the basis 
for state militarism has disappeared. However, it has managed 
to persist as an element of ideology, politics, propaganda, and 
military organization. As a result, reform was halted halfway. 
Putin’s regime has provided a few combat-ready units, which 
were enough to swiftly capture the Crimea. Average trained, 
well-paid military units carried out the order for aggression.
In order to understand the present, it is interesting to 
compare Russia with Germany in the context of the early 19th 
century. Basic principles of the German armed forces were 
laid down by ‘liberals in uniform’: Clausewitz, Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau. It was a constant process of self-education 
by officers of the conscript army, which according to organ-
izers would represent a community of ‘citizens in uniform.’ 
It should be noted that when the ‘liberal’ model was applied in 
an absolute authoritarian Prussian state, it led to the creation 
of an almost perfect war machine that would blindly obey the 
orders of its ‘leader.’ Did Russia follow the same path? Are we 
watching the emergence of a ‘new militarism’ in which ‘modern’ 




The Interplay Between the ‘Hybrid War’ Narrative  
and the ‘Sovereignty-Territory-Resources’ Discourse
Pavel K. Baev, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
In the aftermath of the Crimean ‘anschluss’ in March 2014, the 
content and the style of public and expert debates in Russia 
acquired such a homogeneity of self-righteous aggressiveness 
that the theme ‘the evolution of Russian political thought’ 
appeared exhausted. The intensity of official ‘patriotic’ propa-
ganda gained yet new heights in the months leading to the 70th 
anniversary of victory in the so-called ‘Great Patriotic War.’ 
However, that over-driven self-glorification was backgrounded 
by economic stagnation and international isolation, forcing 
a reckoning with the reality of degeneration and dead-ends. 
From the shadows of doubt, a stream of thoughtful analyses 
has resurfaced, and it is now possible again to contemplate the 
emerging new directions in the above-mentioned evolution.1 
It is certainly hard to expect any kind of blossoming of a 
“brand-new political thinking,” which would require a meet-
ing of two pivotal conditions: milieu, as a critical mass of 
brain-power in open space for debates, and demand, consid-
ering that funding is perhaps less important than the ability to 
make a difference. The former started to emerge during Dmitry 
Medvedev’s failed Rossiya, Vperyod! (“Go-Russia”) inter- 
regnum but has been severely deformed by the onslaught of 
jingoist state-think; while the latter has all but disappeared 
over the course of regime transformations from the ‘enlight-
ened semi-authoritarianism’ to plain corrupt despotism. Polit- 
ical thought seeps through the cracks of the fast-crumbling 
‘pyramid of power,’ stimulated more by the foreboding of yet 
another collapse, than by expectations of a reshuffling of oppor- 
tunities by the elite.2
What is stimulating for such an under-nourished growth of 
political ideas is the obvious incompatibility between the rela- 
tively coherent set of concepts stemming from the key propo- 
sition of ‘sovereignty,’ and the barely comprehensible – but 
aggressive – discourse generated by the fast-evolving ‘hybrid war,’ 
which Russia is effectively waging against the ‘brotherly’ Ukraine.
1. The old mindset: ‘Sovereignty’ and its derivatives
The centrality of the seemingly-innocent proposition of ‘sover-
eignty’ in post-Soviet Russian political thinking is determined 
by the particular interpretation of this term, according to which 
it is not an inherent characteristic of any independent state but 
rather a rare privilege awarded to only a few ‘powers’ that have 
a free will to determine their own destiny. One direct elabo-
1 A few examples of such analyses could be Tatyana Stanovaya, Rossiya i yeye 
ten’: chto meshayet rossiyskoy vneshney politike byt’ uspeshnoy, Carnegie Moscow 
Center, 28 July 2015 (http://carnegie.ru/2015/07/28/ru-60859/idzg) on the Russian 
foreign policy-making; Andrei Kortunov, Poshli na popravku? Rossiysko-amerikan-
skiye otnosheniya: ot kriticheskogo sostoyaniya k stabil’no tyazhelomu, Lenta.ru, 22 
May 2015 (http://lenta.ru/articles/2015/05/21/kortunov/) on Russia-US relations; 
Georgy Bovt, Mezh dvukh mirov, Gazeta.ru, 13 July 2015 (http://www.gazeta.ru/
comments/column/bovt/7634797.shtml) on Russian ‘pivot to Asia’; Alexei Arbatov, 
Zachem Rossiya ugrozhayet Zapadu yadernym oruzhiyem, Voenno-Promyshlennyi 
Kuryer, 1 July 2015 (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/25868) on nuclear issues.
2 Nuances of this foreboding are discussed by Belkovsky and Pavlovsky in 
Mikhail Fishman, Rossiya posle Putina. Stanislav Belkovskiy i Gleb Pavlovskiy o 
nashem budushchem, Slon.ru, 16 July 2015, online at: https://slon.ru/posts/54031. 
See also Grigory Golosov, Kak Putin sdelal smenu rezhima neizbezhnoy, Slon.ru, 24 
July 2015, is online: https://slon.ru/posts/54400.
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ration of this proposition is the concept of ‘multi-polarity,’ 
which argues that the interactions between several ‘sovereign’ 
centers of power shape the character of the world order, and 
Russia’s belonging to this exclusive club is accepted as an ax-
iom, particularly since proving it is rather difficult. Another 
conceptual avenue goes in the direction of ‘non-intervention,’ 
and seeks to counter the Western, in particular the US, pro-
pensity to interfere in various crises under the guise of ‘human-
itarian interventions.’ What makes such opposition a matter 
of crucial importance is the tendency to see anti-authoritarian 
revolutions – from Belgrade to Bahrain – as US-orchestrated 
attempts at ‘regime change,’ therefore indirectly threatening 
Russia’s ‘sovereignty.’3
Each of these trains of self-centric thought could be re-
searched through their particular features. Nevertheless, the spe-
cial connection between an over-loaded notion of ‘sovereignty’ 
and such elementary characteristics of any status quo as terri- 
tory is the target here. In the Russian case, its ‘XXXL size’ 
constitutes one of the main elements in its claim to the status 
of ‘Great Power,’ particularly since the figure given for popu-
lation – not to mention the data on a demographic decline – 
appears less and less convincing. Russia’s ability to exercise its 
highly valued ‘sovereignty’ is therefore conditional on its capac- 
ity for controlling the inhospitable space inside its extraordi-
nary long borders. The value of territory is heavily symbolic – 
hence the political impossibility to reach a compromise on the 
South Kuril Islands with Japan – but it is also material, because 
the unexplored Siberian space is seen as a vast reservoir of nat-
ural resources.4  
While oil is perceived as the uniquely valuable resource – 
which is quite natural for the heavily petro-dependent econo-
my – the underlying assumption is that the global demand for 
every kind of natural resource (including even water) is grow-
ing, and so the net value of Russia’s territory is set to increase.
2. The re-interpretation of “territory” in the Ukraine crisis
While the initial phase of the Ukraine crisis challenged most 
directly Russia’s counter-revolutionary stance, the astonishingly 
successful operation of capturing and annexing Crimea brought 
to the forefront the connection between ‘sovereignty’ and ter-
ritory. The swift incorporation of this province into Russia’s 
territory appeared to prove and to expand its self-conception 
of “sovereignty” – in the sense of confirming its ability to act 
on its political will, rejecting the objections of the guardians of 
status quo – and to compromise Ukraine’s sovereignty. The Rus-
sian leadership probably understood more than anyone else that 
no explanation for this land grab could be convincing for EU, 
USA, or, for that matter, China. However, it still saw the value in 
spelling to an overjoyed domestic audience how the ‘sacredness’ 
of this land, where Russia – or more precisely, the Kievan Rus’ – 
was baptized in 988.5
The need to spin these dubious justifications came during 
the next phase in the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, when 
3 This tendency is pronounced to the extreme degree in Aleksandr Bartosh, 
Razrushitel’nyy tandem: tsvetnaya revolyutsiya – gibridnaya voyna, Nezavisimoe vo- 
ennoe obozrenie, 24 July 2015, online at: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2015-07-24/1_
revolution.html.
4 Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of Security Council, spelled the conviction 
that USA sought to destroy Russia because of its richness in resources; see Nikolai 
Patrushev, Za destabilizatsiyey Ukrainy skryvayetsya popytka radikal’nogo oslableni-
ya Rossii (interview), Kommersant, 22 June 2015, is online: http://kommersant.ru/
doc/2752246. 
5 On Putin’s comparison of Khersones with the Temple Mountain, see Petr Bo-
logov, Chto v realnosti delal Knyaz Vladimir v Sakralnom Krymu, Slon.ru, 10 Decem-
ber 2014, is online: http://slon.ru/world/chto_v_realnosti_delal_knyaz_vladimir_v_
sakralnom_krymu-1193505.xhtml.
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Russia encouraged and manipulated the civil war in Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions. The post-Crimean geopolitical vision in 
Moscow anticipated a complete collapse of the Ukrainian state 
through the secession of a half dozen Eastern and Southern 
regions, forming a pro-Russian ‘Novorossiya.’ This vision, 
however, collapsed in just a few weeks as the escalation of 
hostilities brought an unexpected consolidation in Ukraine 
around its newly-elected government. The barely-camouflaged 
deployment of Russian troops prevented a forceful suppression 
of the secession, but the much-trumpeted ‘victories’ in Ilovaisk 
(August 2014) and Debaltsevo (February 2015) left Moscow 
with the burden of an awkward territorial problem. There was 
neither a political option nor public support for incorporating 
the “rump Novorossiya” into Russia, but providing supplies 
and establishing a semblance of order in this war zone with two 
major cities was an expensive proposition. Instead of adding 
another territorial acquisition, Moscow has created a ‘black 
hole’ which not only consumes material and human resourc-
es but also implicitly undermines the fait accompli of Crimea’s 
‘reunification’ that has been internationally condemned.6 
Territorial expansion has turned out to be detrimental for Rus-
sia’s imagined ‘sovereignty’ as its freedom to maneuver in the 
international arena has become increasingly constricted.
3. The devaluation of (and the disappointment in) resources
Russia’s vulnerability as a state that depends heavily on the 
export of natural resources has been a concern for its elites 
since the spasms of the 2008 economic crisis. For that mat-
ter, Dmitry Medvedev’s ‘modernization’ discourse exploited 
this theme, in contrast with the ‘energy super-power’ rhetoric. 
It was a striking coincidence that the crisis in Ukraine hap-
pened concurrently with a sharp decline of oil prices precipi-
tated by long-accumulating shifts on the global energy markets, 
ensuring that the ‘oil curse’ concerns blended with conspiracy 
theories in order to produce a perception of Western pres-
sure on Russian vulnerabilities. Putin continues to claim – and 
maybe also to believe – that in one or two years the oil price will 
recover. However, there are stronger reasons to assume that it 
might slide to a lower plateau.7 Such a scenario could derail the 
train of thought tethering ‘sovereignty’ to natural resources, 
but in fact the annexation of Crimea makes a poor fit into this 
scheme, not only because Moscow needs to pour resources 
into this new province but also because Crimean agriculture 
depends upon importing from Ukraine the most basic of all 
resources: water. The “rump Novorossiya” has significant re-
serves of coal, but Russia has neither the need for this resource, 
nor the capacity to invest in its production.
It is remarkable in this context that the only macro-region 
where a resource-centric discourse still prevails is the Arctic. 
The surrealistic perceptions of this inhospitable space as a 
‘treasure trove’ of hydrocarbons – that are becoming available 
6 During a visit to Moscow on 10 May 2015, the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel characterized the annexation of Crimea as a “criminal” event. There has 
been no communication between Putin and Merkel after that statement. See Anton 
Troianovsky, Merkel raps Putin over Ukraine conflict during visit to Moscow, Wall 
Street Journal, 10 May 2015, is online: http://www.wsj.com/articles/merkel-raps-
putin-over-ukraine-conflict-during-visit-to-moscow-1431273705.
7 On the impact of this slide, see Olga Solovyeva, Rossiya vozvrashchaye- 
tsya k neftyanym tsenam 1986 goda, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 July 2015, online at: 
http://www.ng.ru/economics/2015-07-27/1_oil.html. On the longer-term trends, 
see Vladimir Sidorovich, Mirovaya energeticheskaya revolyutsiya: zhizn’ posle nefti, 
Forbes.ru, 31 July 2015, is online: http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya/konkurentsi-
ya/295441-mirovaya-energeticheskaya-revolyutsiya-zhizn-posle-nefti. 
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for exploration and inevitably invite geopolitical rivalry – can-
not stand any cost-efficiency evaluation. However, it does not 
stop the ill-assorted Arctic lobbies in the Kremlin (as Nikolai 
Patrushev who became a key figure) from recycling themselves. 
While Gazprom and Rosneft cannot develop feasible plans for 
off-shore projects, it is the High Command – led by opinionated 
Sergei Shoygu – that is presently the most vociferous advocate 
for expanding Russia’s ‘possessions’ on the continental shelf, 
even if the claim to the UN CLCS8 – submitted after long de-
lays in August 2015 – has slim chance of being approved. In the 
military-strategic statements on Russian priorities, the Arctic is 
invariably defined as one of the key ‘theaters’ – and the allo-
cation of resources follows suit, so that the scale and intensity 
of military activities in the High North are steadily growing.9 
It is plainly impossible to identify any hostile intent towards the 
prohibitively expensive and far-from-enormous resources in the 
Russian Arctic, but that does not check the militarized ambitions.
4. Shortcomings and risks of the ‘hybrid war’ proposition
Despite engaging in a very particular sort of conflict with 
Ukraine – that is often defined as a ‘hybrid war’ – Russia remains 
unable to conceptualize it in a coherent way, partly because it 
remains in denial of its own military intervention. This denial 
– transparent as it is – influences the character of combat 
operations, so that, for instance, Russian Air Force cannot deliver 
any strikes, while it is exactly the aerial dimension that is con-
sidered crucial to modern wars. At the same time, it is possible 
to make some assumptions on the changes in thinking regard-
ing the projection of Russia’s power after it has accumulated 
this experience mismanaging the Ukraine crisis.
The initial design of this ‘hybrid war’ featured a very limited 
use of military force – primarily special operations – in combi-
nation with other instruments of policy, including well-known 
economic pressure and new means of cyber-warfare.10  What is 
interesting for this analysis is the departure from the traditional 
military aims of capturing key strategic points in an enemy’s 
territory, alongside the introduction of non-territorial goals 
like weakening the opponent’s sovereignty by undermining its 
capacity to mobilize material resources and political will. 
In reality, however, the Russian leadership discovered that 
any experiment with cyber instruments could backfire, and 
also the energy instruments are far from reliable. In fact, gas 
exports to, and via, Ukraine has continued with only minor 
interruptions. The propagandistic means were exploited to a 
maximum, but they have failed to significantly impact Ukraine, 
whose Eastern regions firmly refused to subscribe to the propo-
sition of ‘Novorossiya.’ Russia found itself on the receiving end 
of well-targeted economic sanctions, while NATO is eager to 
explore new options available in building a ‘hybrid defense.’11  
This mutation of the initial ‘neither-war-nor-peace’ plan has 
delivered Russia into a situation where the ‘hybrid’ features 
of the conflict work more against its interests than in favor of 
them. Russia’s economic posture is particularly compromised, 
and this leaves the Kremlin with the conclusion that only mil-
8 United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
9 My examination of this train of thought is in Pavel Baev, Russia’s Arctic as-
pirations, in Juha Jokela (ed.), Arctic Security Matters, EUISS Report, 24, 17 June 
2015, pp. 51-56, online at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/
arctic-security-matters-1/.
10 This design presented by the Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, is 
evaluated in Mark Galeotti, The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian non-linear war, 
In Moscow’s Shadows, 6 July 2014, is online: https://inmoscowsshadows.word-
press.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/.
11 Galeotti suggests a useful menu of such options. See: Mark Galeotti, Time 
to think about ‘hybrid defense,’ War on the Rocks, 30 July 2015, is online: http://
warontherocks.com/2015/07/time-to-think-about-hybrid-defense/.
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itary instruments could possibly guarantee its sovereignty. 
The intervention in Syria was supposed to prove the usefulness 
of these instruments, but it has delivered Russia to just another 
military deadlock. It has to regain the initiative for putting 
these instruments to political use, thus proving that Russia has 
one major advantage over the hesitant West – the readiness to 
accept greater risks – while it is factually approaching the point 
of over-exertion.
5. The denial of diminished ‘sovereignty’ sets a political trap
As the official discourse turns more primitive without gaining 
in coherence, the question “What is he really up to?” acquires 
greater urgency and involves a disappearing possibility of actu-
ally finding a comprehensible answer. Putin cannot fail to see 
that the model of a resource-exporting state has stopped work-
ing but the only alternative that ensures Russia’s ‘sovereignty’ is 
the military-mobilization model, which was noisily advertised 
during the celebrations of the ‘Great Victory’ in May 2015. 
This model, however, does not fit with the lifestyle of Putin’s 
elites and it is clearly unsustainable due to an elementary short-
age of money and technologies. It has become plain clear that 
the Kremlin – where the shrinking of Putin’s ‘narrow circle’ of 
courtiers has resulted in a noticeable reduction of brain-power 
 – cannot invent a new discourse for proving Russia’s ‘great-
powerness.’ The Russian leadership has to insist on the infal-
libility of its course to asserting ‘sovereignty’ at the expense 
of neighbors, and so Russia finds itself compelled to proceed 
along the track that cannot possibly succeed.
 Turning Crimea into an ‘unalienable’ part of Russia neces-
sarily means that Moscow could not abandon the rebel ‘qua-
si-republics’ in Donetsk and Luhansk, whatever are the mu-
tual false pretenses in the ‘Minsk process.’ This means that it 
12 Vladislav Inozemtsev, one of the participants in The Evolution of Russian 
Political Thought after 1991 International Workshop, made a similar argument in 
Vladislav Inozemtsev, Propustit’ povorot, Gazeta.ru, 29 July 2015, is online: http://www.
gazeta.ru/column/vladislav_inozemcev/7659597.shtml. For an obdurate counter- 
point, see Sergei Karaganov, Kitayskiy veter duyet v nashi parusa, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 
31 May 2015, is online: http://www.rg.ru/2015/05/31/evrazia-site.html.
remains locked in the confrontation, which it cannot hope to 
bring to a draw (not to mention win). The only way for sustain-
ing this confrontation is through upgrading its strategic part-
nership with China, but this ‘too-close-for-comfort’ embrace 
brings a different problem for Russia’s shrinking ‘sovereignty’: 
it finds itself in a dependent and subordinate position vis-à-vis 
its almighty neighbor, which in fact, prioritizes its own develop-
ment of a “new type of great power relations” with the USA.12 
Moscow finds it increasingly difficult to prove its strategic value 
to Beijing, particularly as natural resources depreciate, and sus-
pects that the bold assault on the foundations of the interna-
tional order has put Russia in the position of a revisionist power 
gone-too-far and, therefore, a designated loser. The intervention 
in Syria did momentarily create an impression of Russia’s ability 
to make a difference by taking high risks in projecting military 
power. Nevertheless, by spring 2016 that impression changed 
into a recognition of limits of Russia’s power. The logic of the 
‘hybrid war,’ however, has gained plenty of self-propelling 
dynamics, so the ability of the Kremlin leadership to break 
from its self-made trap of making a limited military power into 
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The American ‘other’ continues to be significant for the 
creation of post-Soviet Russian identity. In the period of 1990s 
an image of the friendly American ‘other’ prevailed in Rus-
sian social and political discourse because of the new Amer-
ican crusade for Russian freedom and of the liberalization of 
post-Soviet Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.1  Rus-
sian Amerikanistika also reacted to these changes by shifting 
the focus of the historical representation of the American past 
from conflict to continuity and success. The translation into 
Russian of classic works of Max Lerner,2 Daniel J. Boorstin,3 
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr,4  and Louis Hartz5   was sponsored by 
the United States Information Agency at the peak of this new 
pro-American attitude in Russian society. These books high-
lighted those traditions and features of the American character 
that allowed the United States to emerge as a country of liberty, 
democracy, economic leadership, and advanced technologies 
and promoted a positive image of the United States in Russia.6 
However, by the early 2000s, the general attitude toward the 
United States had changed.
1. The New Russian narrative on ‘the other’
Anti-American feelings skyrocketed as a result of the disap-
pointment with Russia’s 1990s domestic policies, govern-
ment efforts to build a new national identity, using the United 
States as the ‘other,’ and the reaction to the U.S. foreign policy 
decisions in the last years of Bill Clinton’s presidency and 
during the whole George W. Bush administration, including 
the bombing of Yugoslavia, policies in Georgia and Ukraine, 
the war in Iraq, and the eastward expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. As if it wanted to introduce the 
Russian readers to the U.S. critics of the American experience, 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Ameri-
can Embassy sponsored the 2006 Russian-language publication 
of the radical historian Howard Zinn’s now-classic A People’s 
History of the United States.7 Zinn’s book provided the Russian 
readers with an alternative history of the United States through 
the eyes of disadvantaged Americans, including women and rep-
resentatives of racial and ethnic minorities. The Russian book 1 About the American crusade for Russian freedom see: David Foglesong, The 
American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a “Free Russia” since 1881, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, pp. 196-218.
2 Max Lerner, America as civilization: Life and thought in the United States 
today, Simon and Schuster, New York 1957.
3 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience, Random 
House, Allied, New York-Bombay 1958; Idem, The Americans: The National 
Experience, Random House, New York 1965; Idem, The Americans: The Democratic 
Experience, Random House, New York 1973.
4 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The cycles of American history, Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston 1986.
5 Louis Hartz, The liberal tradition in America, Harcourt & Brace, New York 1955.
6 About the evolution of the Post-Soviet Amerikanistika see in details: Ivan 
Ivanovich Kurilla & Victoria Ivanovna Zhuravleva, Teaching U.S. History in Russia: 
Issues, Challenges, and Prospects, The Journal of American History, 96 (4), March 
2010, pp. 1138-1144. See also editors’ introduction in: Ivan Ivanovich Kurilla & 
Victoria Ivanovna Zhuravleva (eds.), Russian/Soviet Studies in the United States, 
Amerikanistika in Russia: Mutual Representations in Academic Projects, Lexington 
Books, London 2015.
7 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present, Harper 
& Collins, New York 2003.
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market was flooded with translations of American books that 
espoused a critical view of the US domestic and foreign policy, 
such as the new translation of Zinn’s one under the title Ameri-
kanskaya Imperiya. S 1492 goda do Nashikh Dney (literally “The 
American Empire from 1492 to our days”),8 Oliver Stone’s 
and Peter Kuznick’s The Untold History of the United States,9 
Dinesh D’Souza’s America: Imagine a World without Her.10 
Today, the image of the hostile American ‘other’ predominates 
in political and social rhetoric and media representations.
In retrospect, it can be argued that the rapprochement be-
tween Russia and the United States and the rejection of simpli-
fied schemes of mutual understanding that accompany it, have 
always taken place during those periods when Russia and the 
United States have expanded the agenda of their relationship 
by resisting a common enemy, or global challenges and threats. 
This was the case of the two World Wars and the large-scale 
anti-terror campaigns after the 9/11 terror attacks. It has also 
happened in the times of political reforms and/or economic 
modernization in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, post- 
Soviet Russia, when the U.S. exported goods, capital and tech-
nologies and Americans taught Russians the lessons of capital-
ism and reforms. With respect to the 20th century, one can recall 
the period of industrialization in the Soviet Union, the idea of 
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev “to catch up and surpass the 
United States in production,”11 the modernization program 
that built on the American experience during the presidency of 
Boris Yeltsin, or the Partnership for Modernization program 
declared by the then-President Dmitry Medvedev. During these 
periods, the U.S. had served as an example to be copied.
From 2000 onwards, during the period of stabilization 
with its characteristic consolidation of power structures, grow-
ing authoritarianism, and rejection of reforms, the trend that 
emerges is that of creating the image of a hostile American 
‘other’ in Russia and of a hostile Russian ‘other’ in the U.S. 
This, in turn, has led to the rise of anti-Americanism and ‘rus-
sophobia,’ both of which can be actively deployed to achieve 
political goals and to revitalize nationalism. This phenomenon 
had reached its full height during the Cold War, whose legacy 
influences the current crisis in Russian-American relations.
2. The ‘hostility-building process’
The Ukrainian crises became an indicator of a critical crisis in 
the relationship between the U.S. and post-Soviet Russia and 
actualized an image of the hostile American ‘other’ in Russian 
social and political discourse, since both of these crises are 
directly connected with the broader crisis of managing global 
and regional processes in a post-Cold War world. Currently, 
all the factors that influence the process of mutual percep-
tion – the climate of Russian-American relations, the national 
(respectively Russian or American) socio-cultural and political 
context, the international situation, and the historical legacy 
(not only the legacy of the Cold War but also that of the 1990s, 
when the asymmetrical character of bilateral relations was estab- 
lished) – are unambiguously negative.
The ‘information war’ has become one of the most impor-
tant features of the current crisis in Russian-American rela-
tions. We are dealing with the practice as well as the discourse 
of the Cold War, although there is no reason to talk about the 
start of full-scale Cold War II for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
8 Howard Zinn, Amerikanskaya imperiya. S 1492 goda do nashikh dney, Algo-
ritm, Moskva 2014.
9 Oliver Stone & Peter Kuznick, The Untold History of the United States, Gal-
lery Books, New York 2012.
10 Dinesh D’Souza, America: Imagine a World without Her, Regnery Publish-
ing, Washington D.C. 2014.
11 Alan M. Ball, Imagining America: Influence and Images in Twentieth-century 
Russia, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2003, p. 156.
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the Cold War was a systemic phenomenon, and Russia, ceas-
ing to be a superpower, was no longer capable of offering 
the world an alternative model opposed to liberal capitalism. 
Secondly, with the collapse of the bipolar system of interna-
tional relations, the world has become polar-centric and Rus-
sian-American relations per se no longer determine the course 
of international development, while being seen in its context. 
Thirdly, unlike the Cold War, this crisis does not have the char-
acter of a military confrontation with its inherent arms race. 
Instead, its main dimensions are geopolitical, geo-economic 
and informational. Fourthly, the Iron Curtain is absent, and it 
is already impossible to prevent the flow of information and 
the development of people-to-people contacts in the context of 
globalization. Fifthly, the Ukrainian crisis is one of many cur-
rent crises taking place in the world in which there remains the 
possibility of Russian-American cooperation that doesn’t only 
include non-proliferation and arms control.
Old stereotypes are mutually repeated in speeches by politi- 
cians and social figures, experts and journalists, and also visu- 
ally in political cartoons on both sides of the Atlantic. This 
practice is characterized by the disregard of some facts for the 
sake of others. It has led to simplistic explanatory sketches that 
‘demonize’ the enemy and to the use of the ‘American card’ in 
Russian domestic political games and vice versa. 
In today’s Russia, the work of constructing the image of the 
United States as a hostile country – that views itself as the vic-
tor in the Cold War, that wants to impose its dictates and dou-
ble standards on the whole world, that has irresponsibly played 
with religious extremists and radicals to achieve political goals 
– has reached unprecedented levels. Anti-American sentiment 
is on the rise in Russia, hitting the highest level in almost fifteen 
years. According to the Levada Center opinion poll, half of the 
Russian population is sure that America impedes Russia’s de-
velopment. 31 per cent of Russians fear a military intervention 
and occupation by the USA. At the same time, 33 per cent are 
sure that, in a hypothetical case of a war against the US and its 
allies, Russia would be able to gain a victory.12 According to the 
Pew Research Center polls only 15 per cent of Russians have a 
favorable opinion of America, down from 56 per cent in 201113 
and there is hardly another nation in the world that has such 
a high level of resentment as well as such a negative attitude 
towards the USA.14
This anti-Americanism is being used both to support a siege 
mentality and to construct the national idea. The President 
Vladimir Putin himself encourages the political discourse 
to follow these lines. It is sufficient to look at Putin’s Valdai 
speech given in Sochi on October 25, 201415 or to see the docu-
mentary television film entitled Krym. Doroga domoy (“Crimea. 
The Way Home,” 2015). Putin cranked up the volume of anti- 
Americanism after protest movements in late 2011 and 2012, 
which he blamed on the State Department. But it wasn’t until 
the Ukrainian crisis that anti-Americanism spreads from ordi-
nary street vendors all the way up to the Kremlin. The Russian 
federal television channels, the main source of news for more 
than 90 percent of Russians, feed and propagate these senti-
ments and prejudices.16
12 Levada-Tsentr, Ugroza dlya Rossii so Storony SShA, ATsYuL, Moscow, 12 
May 2015.
13 Jacob Poushter, Key findings from our poll on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, 
Pew Research Center, 10 June 2015, is online: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/06/10/key-findings-from-our-poll-on-the-russia-ukraine-conflict/.
14 PRC, Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm 
to America’s Image, Pew Research Center, 14 July 2014, is online: http://www.pew-
global.org/2014/07/14/chapter-1-the-american-brand/.
15 Putin’s speech at Valdai International Discussion Club, 24 October 2014, 
is online: http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/46860.
16 Michael Birnbaum, Russia’s anti-American fever goes beyond the Soviet era’s, 
The Washington Post, 8 March 2015, is online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/europe/russias-anti-us-sentiment-now-is-even-worse-than-it-was-in-soviet-
union/2015/03/08/b7d534c4-c357-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html.
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Russian high-ranking officials like to emphasize that the 
Western countries and, first of all, the United States bend their 
efforts to prevent Russia from getting of its knees and to dis-
credit all Russian attempts to do something of international 
significance as the Russia’s actions in different regions or the 
organization of Olympic Games and the 2018 FIFA World 
Cup. President Putin suggested that “the Washington obkom” 
had “prohibited” some countries in Europe from joining 
‘Victory Day’ celebrations in Moscow on May 9, 2015 and Rus-
sia’s Security Council, in its turn, accused the United States 
of plotting to oust President Vladimir Putin by financing the 
opposition and encouraging mass demonstrations, less than a 
week after a protest leader Boris Nemtsov was murdered near 
the Kremlin. War of sanctions against Russia became an impor-
tant argument in this rhetoric. Being anti-American at the bot-
tom, it correlates with the nationwide demand for greatness, 
which has emerged in the second half of Putin’s lengthy reign 
as the part of a new and unspoken social contract between the 
authorities and the people.
The reference to the double standards of the American pol-
itics has become a favorite communicative strategy that aims 
to reassert the legitimacy of Russia’s actions in Ukraine within 
anti-American discourse. Political, public, and media figures 
have eagerly taken up and broadly used Putin’s famous thesis 
– “Why do they have the permission while we do not?” How-
ever, what lies behind this anti-American message that seems 
quite persuasive to a broad layer of the Russian society is a 
complex spectrum of love-hate feelings towards America, all of 
which are deeply rooted in the public consciousness and play 
an important role in Russia’s identity discourse. 
As the Russian sociologist Alexei Levinson accurately 
observed in 2007,
America is our only significant Other. The rivalry with America does 
not unravel in the ‘real’ world arena, but in its reflection that exists in 
the Russian mass consciousness. And in this sphere, what matters is 
not to defeat the Other, but to be completely certain that we ‘are not 
worse than them’ [...] In this worldview, examples of good relations 
with America are an acknowledgement that they are equal to us or sim-
ilar to us, and we – to them as the only basis for mutual good feelings. 17 
In its turn Angela Stent argues:
The recognition of the reality that Russia is less important per se, that 
indirectly is a continuing source of irritation to Russian officials. In this 
sense, the various American resets have represented attempts to en-
gage Russia productively by persuading it to acknowledge and accept 
the asymmetries in the relationship and move forward on that basis. 
Putin’s 2001 attempted reset, by contrast, was a bid to establish a strate-
gic partnership of equals, acting as if these asymmetries did not exist. 18 
The image of America as a singular ‘dark twin’ to Russia is 
essential to this mindset. The constant urge to highlight that 
America has serious problems in domestic and foreign politics, 
that their claims to mentor Russia are ludicrous, and that Rus-
sia has never engaged in the kind of foreign policy that the U.S. 
has made, for example, in Kosovo and that establishes danger-
ous international precedents. Paradoxically, Russia is currently 
attempting to legitimize its policy actions towards Crimea by 
describing them precisely as being similar to the US actions 
that it considers to be illegitimate.
17 Alexei Levinson, America as «Significant Other», Pro et Contra, 11 (2), 
March-April 2007, p. 69.
18 Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the 21st 
Century, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford 2014, pp. XI-XII, 257.
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3. The legitimizing ‘other’
Just as it was common for the Soviet propaganda and its what- 
aboutism, Russian state-controlled media are now increasingly 
drawing public attention to the events in Ferguson and Bal-
timore and to the general upsurge of racial controversy in the 
U.S., the spy scandals and Edward Snowden’s revelations, 
tortures in secret CIA prisons, and to the U.S. foreign policy 
from Iraq to Syria.19 These events are undoubtedly a blow to 
America’s international reputation. Yet, their use as a means of 
legitimizing one’s own breaches of international legal norms has 
its limits. Once again, these references underscore Russia’s 
potential lack of preparedness to play the role of defender of 
global norms, which Russia had cultivated with so much effort 
before the onset of the Ukrainian crisis. In addition, Russian 
authorities, politicians and some journalists have started draw-
ing parallels not only with the current U.S. foreign policy, but 
also with its continental expansionism in the 19th century (in this 
case, Crimea’s incorporation is compared to the incorporation 
of the Texas). Thus, the arguments in favor of Russia’s 21st cen-
tury policy are found in the American 19th century policy. In the 
context of the construction of the image that America is a hostile 
‘other’ to Russia, the dichotomy American universalist liberalism 
versus Russian national conservatism has been actualized. 
President Vladimir Putin, in the spirit of Russian 19th cen-
tury conservatives, loves to discuss Russia’s genetic code or 
to talk about the unique Russian soul.20 This has resulted in a 
return to the famous debates among Westernizers (zapadniki) 
and slavophiles that took place more than a century ago and 
have been stimulated by Russia’s turn to the East. By reminding 
the Russian people of their civilizational and sacred roots, Putin 
explained the incorporation of Crimea in his Federal Assembly 
Address on December 4, 2014. 
The Russian annexation of Crimea 21 made the West to sub-
ject Russia to an unprecedented pressure, which has in turn con-
tributed to the growth of conservative and patriotic sentiments 
in the country.22 Discussions resumed about the so-called Rus-
sia’s unique development destiny, the existence of a unique 
Russian civilization in the world, and the role of Russian tra-
ditions and history. One side of this debate is monopolized by 
the Russian conservatives, whose ranks have recently started 
to increase. They argue that in the 1990s the Modern Russia 
has had its own destructive ‘revolution’ that was driven by the 
desire to break with the country’s historical experience and to 
implement Western/American prescriptions for political and 
economic development, without taking into account the existing 
conditions. Over the past decade, the country has barely started 
to overcome the serious negative consequences that these efforts 
had produced.23 Now Russian conservatives prefer to respond to 
domestic and foreign critics, who are demanding drastic change, 
with the words of Stolypin: “You need great upheavals – we 
need a great Russia!” This phrase of the former Russian prime 
minister is well known and commonly used outside the context 
in which it was spoken. On the other side stands the relatively 
19 The visualization of these ideas you may find in the cartoons of Vitaly 
Podvitsky who works for the pro-Kremlin RIA Novosti, a news agency, also known 
as Rossiya Segodnya. Online at: http://podvitski.ru/.
20 Nina L. Khrushcheva, Inside Vladimir Putin’s Mind: Looking Back in Anger, 
World Affairs, July-August 2014, is online: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/arti-
cle/inside-vladimir-putin%E2%80%99s-mind-looking-back-anger.
21 Petr Kopka, Ukrainian statehood after Crimea, what comes next?, Russia 
Direct, 13 March 2015, is online: http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/ukrainian-
statehood-after-crimea-what-comes-next.
22 Eugene Bai, The real reason why a resurgence of conservatism in Russia is 
dangerous, Russia Direct, 24 April 2015, is online: http://www.russia-direct.org/
analysis/real-reason-why-resurgence-conservatism-russia-dangerous.
23 Nikolay Pakhomov, The future of Russian conservatism is a lot less scary than 
the West thinks, Russia Direct, 12 May 2015, is online: http://www.russia-direct.
org/opinion/future-russian-conservatism-lot-less-scary-west-thinks.
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small but active number of Russian liberals 24  and representatives 
of the democratic opposition, supported by the West. These 
critics began to reproach Russian conservatives for various sins, 
including nationalism, isolationism, obscurantism, and ignorance. 
The image of the United States as a hostile ‘other’ correlates 
with the ardent social and political debates about the role of 
Russian liberalism in the political life of Putin’s Russia as well as 
the meaning of the word ‘liberal.’ According to the actual propa- 
ganda, the liberals are those who stole from the public coffers 
in the 1990s, joined the opposition ranks in the 2000s, and 
since 2010 has been simply hoping for the disintegration of 
their semi-mobilized country. ‘The fifth column,’ ‘the national- 
traitors,’ and ‘the US State Department agents’ have become 
popular epithets for market economy and fair election advocates. 
Sergey Obukhov, a Duma deputy and the Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation (KPRF) Central Committee Secre-
tariat, has expressed this idea with great clarity:
The meaning of word ‘liberal’ in the mass conscience has been com-
pletely changed, because the liberal project and its leaders have failed 
in Russia. To be more precise, what failed is what was carried out under 
the name and the banner of a liberal project, which was really the US 
global project that has all the markings of a geopolitical confrontation. 
This project imposes the US values on the entire world. Its under- 
standing of human rights goes against our traditional cultural and 
mental values. In my opinion, these are the origins of the mass neg-
ative attitudes towards the word ‘liberal,’ which has become a swear-
word in our country. 25
4. A value-based approach in Russian-American relations
Meanwhile, the American political and media discourse re-
sponds to the current crises with a predominantly value-based 
approach to the image of Russia. Unlike the pragmatic ap-
proach, it correlates directly with the American socio-cultural 
context and is based on the certainty that Russia’s foreign pol-
icies are an extension of its domestic policies. And this man-
ner of thinking is a typical outward projection of one basic 
self-representation of the American society itself: the belief 
that the U.S. foreign policy is based on its democratic polit-
ical system. A value-based approach determines the Russian 
strand of the American foreign policy. It is derived from the 
domestic political situation in Russia, whose leaders, from an 
American point of view, should be punished for their grow-
ing authoritarianism and for their foreign policy, first of all, for 
their policy toward Ukraine. US democratic presidential candi-
date Hillary Clinton labels Russia, Iran, and North Korea ‘tra-
ditional security threats’ to the United States and calls for more 
sanctions on Russia.26 The Republicans promise to ‘teach Rus-
sia a lesson.’ The new National Military Strategy of the United 
States describes Russia as the threat to the American interests 
because Russia is a ‘revisionist power’ that violates the norms 
of the world order.27 The coverage of U.S.-Russia policy28 is, 
by and large, one-dimensional in US media. As James Carden 
explains in his article in the Nation, dissenting opinion on US 
24 Eugene Bai, Putin’s Orthodox conservatives vs. Russia’s unorthodox liberals, 
Russia Direct, 20 January 2015, is online: http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/
putins-orthodox-conservatives-vs-russias-unorthodox-liberals. 
25 Meduza – a group of Russian journalists and reporters that promotes the free-
dom of information – asked politicians and public figures to explain who ‘a liberal’ is. 
See, Meduza, V znachenii «poryadochnyy chelovek» «Meduza» vyyasnila u politikov 
i obshchestvennykh deyateley, kto takoy «liberal», Meduza News, 10 April 2015, is 
online: https://meduza.io/feature/2015/04/10/v-znachenii-poryadochnyy-chelovek.
26 See, for example, Hillary Clinton’s speeches about Russia are online in the 
Huffington Post website: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/hillary-clinton-russia/.  
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America, June 2015, p.2, is online: http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Docu-
ments/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.
28 Eugene Bai, The information war between the US and Russia is just getting 
started, Russia Direct, 3 February 2015, is online: http://www.russia-direct.org/opin-
ion/information-war-between-us-and-russia-just-getting-started.
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Chapter IX
Transformation of Security Culture in Russia: 
Domestic and Foreign Factors
Olga Pavlenko, Russian State University 
for the Humanities
The notion of ‘security culture’ holds a special place in the po-
litical knowledge system. Christopher Daase interprets it as a 
“sum of values, discourses, practices” developed within societies 
and giving rise to various models of interaction of “security” and 
“freedom.” In Russia, it is viewed as a “system code” of macro- 
(globalization) and micro-dynamics (regionalization) of the 
modern world and associated with a phenomenology of trust.1 
‘Security’ and ‘trust’ are the categories that lately have been in 
the limelight of Russian specialists and politicians. Affected by 
the Ukrainian crisis, EU and US leaders declared that they lost 
their trust in Russia. But since February 2015, this process has 
become reciprocal. The ‘symbolic universe’ of the post-bipolar 
world found itself split open, and as for the institutions and 
values of Western democracy, they were discredited in the eyes 
of a considerable part of Russian population. Against this back-
policy toward Russia becomes impermissible. He emphasizes 
that a plurality of voices on Russia can no longer be easily 
found within the U.S. mainstream media and this atmosphere 
reminds the period of McCarthyism, when any voices thought 
to be sympathetic to the Soviet Union were publicly exposed 
and denounced.29 The attack on the Carnegie Moscow Centre 
accused of being a “Trojan horse” for Russian influence is rath-
er symptomatic in this context.30
Russia, in turn, uses this American approach and this anti- 
Russian campaign to foster the anti-American sentiment in order 
to shape the image of a hostile American ‘other.’ A campaign 
to eradicate ‘hostile’ foreign influences, first of all American 
one, was launched in Russia. The Flex exchange program, the 
American Council for International Education, the Ameri-
can Cultural Center, the MacArthur Foundation became the 
objects of this ‘foreign agents-hunt.’ James Carden found a 
McCartism trend in contemporary US media attitude towards 
Russia, but the political era in today’s Russia is reminiscent of 
the McCarthy era in 1950s America in a greater degree.
1 Cristopher Daase, Sicherheitskultus – Ein Konzept zur interdisziplinären Er-
forchung politishen und sozialen Wadels, Sicherheit und Frieden, 29 (2), 2011, pp. 
59-65; Dmitry Lukyanov, Aggression der Sicherheit, in Arnd Bauerkämper & Natalia 
Rostislavleva (eds.), Sicherheitskulturen im Vergleich, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 
Paderborn 2014, pp. 181-192; Petr Alekseyevich Nikolaev, Kul’tura kak faktor na- 
tsional’noy bezopasnosti, Russkiy impul’s, Moskva 2007; Vyacheslav Nikolayevich 
Kuznetsov, Geokul’turnaya entsiklopediya: kul’tura razvitiya cherez kul’turu bezopa- 
snosti, Kniga i Biznes, Moskva 2009; Idem. Sotsiologiya bezopasnosti, MGU, Mosk-
va 2007; Yuliya Vital’yevna Fetisova, Kul’tura bezopasnosti, Candidate of sciences’ 
dissertation, OGPU, Omsk 2009; Aleksandr Semonovich Kapto, Ot kul’tury voyny 
k kul’ture Mira, Respublika, Moskva 2002; Diana Edikovna Gasparyan, Sotsial’nost’ 
kak negativnost,’ KDU, Moskva 2007.
29 James Carden, Neo-McCarthyism and the US Media. The crusade to ban Russia 
policy critics, The Nation, 19 May 2015 is online: http://www.thenation.com/article/
neo-mccarthyism-and-us-media/.
30 James Kirchick, How a U.S. Think Tank Fell for Putin, The Daily Beast, 27 July 
2015, is online: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/27/how-a-u-s-think-
tank-fell-for-putin.html. For a critic response to this article, see: Leonid Bershidsky, 
Putin Hurts a Think Tank by Not Banning It, Bloomberg, 28 July 2015 is online:http://
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-07-28/how-putin-tarnishes-moscow-carneg-
ie-center-by-omission.
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ground, the phenomenon of the ‘aggression of security’ – created 
by media manipulations – has been growing in strength.
The Giddens’ ‘risk mentality’ is typical of the political class 
of the post-Soviet Russia that has acquired a considerable ex-
perience in overcoming internal and external threats over the 
past twenty-five years. In this paper, the security culture should 
be understood as a system of value paradigms, discourses, 
political practices and social communications whose combi-
nation creates the society’s self-identity and its reflections on 
the outside world. In other words, it is a special sociocultural 
reality combining the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of 
expectations.’ Despite a hypersensitivity to external and inter-
nal influences, dialectic flexibility and mutability, it reproduces 
certain ‘constants’ emerging in existential conditions of any his-
torical era, irrespective of political regimes. They form a frame 
that was conveniently named the ‘Russian system’ at the turn 
of millennium by political experts Pivovarov and Fursov, who 
were trying to uncover the factors of stability and development 
of the gigantic Eurasian state.2 
It is certain that the conceptual schemes of the policy de-
scription, monitoring, evaluation and analysis directly depend 
on the ‘ideological filters’ existing in the minds of researchers 
that involuntarily determine the selection of information and 
the ways of commenting on it. In addition to personal and col-
lective preferences, as well as a current state of affairs, there 
is often a certain something defined as ‘self-censorship.’ Any 
research paper may be compared to a closely woven fabric with 
an intricate pattern made of fibers that vary in composition 
and quality. This article will present only a brief outline of key 
trends in the interpretation of security-related categories with-
in the Russian political thought. Any attempt at systematization 
is always subjective. I left out of my analysis all the texts of po-
litical rather than research nature that distort reality through the 
lenses of set ideologemes. It is the politologic research that inter-
ests me and not the tools of information warfare. Even though 
they undoubtedly deserve a particular attention. One can distin-
guish several levels in the analysis of security culture of Russia – 
sociocultural, geopolitical, strategic thinking, military-technical. 
All of them are tightly intertwined with each other.
1. The sociocultural level
A study of the history of security notions and perceptions, 
the reflections of intellectuals and politicians on the cases of 
challenges and threats, the society’s mobilization potential in 
various historical eras are crucial aspects. Modern research, as 
a rule, is focused on the transformation of discourses of the 
‘other’ and the consecutive steps of the historical maturing of 
‘foreign-enemy-other-another’ in the strata of folk and elite 
cultures. The symbolic interaction between the ‘me’ and the 
‘other’ reveals the typology of risks, standards and values of the 
Russian society,3 as well as Russian ‘geopolitical fears’ generated 
by historical experience. 
There were several attempts at the systematization of nu-
merous opinions and visions existing among Russian political 
scientists. One of the first generalization schemes was sug-
gested in 2004 by Ivan Tyulin in the MGIMO textbook Sovre-
mennyye Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya i Mirovaya Politika 
(“Contemporary International Relations and World Politics”).4 
2 For these attempts of historical-cultural and politological analysis of the ‘Rus-
sian system,’ see: Yuriy Sergeyevich Pivovarov & Andrey Il’ich Fursov, Russkaya si- 
stema, Rubezhi, 1, 1995, pp. 45-69; and  2, 1995, pp. 32-53;  3, 1995, pp. 42-60;  4, 1995, 
pp. 32-44; 5, 1995, pp. 29-46; 6, 1995, pp. 44-65.
3 The famous school of Mikhail Bakhtin, exploring the development mecha-
nisms of ‘me/other’ discourse, had significantly affected the progress of Russian cul-
turological studies of international relations.
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In the course of the following ten years, this analysis matrix has 
not undergone any substantial changes. Tyulin distinguished 
two main approaches that differed from each other in their 
geopolitical interpretation of the West and consequently of 
national values. There are two key interpretations of the Rus-
sia-West dichotomy: a conservative and a liberal one. It should 
be noted that the perception of conservatism and liberalism in 
Russia is quite different from the definitions generally accepted 
in the West. The Russian interpretations are based on a geopo-
litical paradigm that corresponds to the centuries-old existential 
Russian question: Is Russia a part of the Western world or does 
it have its own, unique path? Through the changes of political 
eras and regimes, this question has always remained relevant 
for the Russian society. Over the last two centuries, the Rus-
sia-West dichotomy, the topic introduced already in the middle 
of the XIXth century by the discussions of Slavophiles and pro- 
Western thinkers, has been redefined, updated through new dis-
courses, but has preserved essentially the same semantic codes.
The conservative thinking in Russia has a very long-stand-
ing tradition.5 It is focused on the stabilization of social struc-
ture, the national forces, the centrist type of administration. 
Since the nineties, a new school of political realism began to 
emerge in Russia alongside with the Neo-Eurasianism. Over 
the last five years, the political conservatism has turned into 
a dominant trend and the Neo-Eurasianists joined forces with 
the new statists. 
The second, pro-liberal group includes the political scien-
tists that realize the need for Russia to closely cooperate with 
transatlantic institutions when it comes to economy, finances, 
information and communications, environmental protection 
and security.6 But it would be cognitive simplism to present 
Russian conservatives and liberals as the complete opposites 
of each other. While they oppose each other in specific polit-
ical circumstances, they still share many cultural and ethical 
values. The political texts of both movements feature such 
common elements as advocacy of reforms, war on corruption, 
protection of traditions and stable development of society. 
Yet, bitter disputes break out between them over the essence 
and character of the political power, the nature of its cooper-
ation with civil society. In their Sotsiologiya Mezhdunarodnykh 
Otnosheniy (“Sociology of international relations”),7 Pavel and 
Andrey Tsygankov place special emphasis on the analysis of 
movements within the Russian liberalism. The authors iden-
tify three major groups: modernizers, national democrats and 
institutionalists. The debates between them concern, in au-
thors’ opinion, the following notions: “world order”, “sover-
eignty and national interests”, “foreign policy guidelines.”8 
The same old circle of geopolitical concepts that the Russian 
political thought is possibly doomed to continue to run around in.
In 2013, Andrey Tsygankov singled out three key princi-
ples shared by the ‘Russian pro-Western thinkers.’ Firstly, the 
superiority of the Western civilization as a model of historical 
4 Ivan Georgiyevich Tyulin, Novyye Tendentsii v Rossiyskikh Issledovaniyakh 
Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy, in Anatoly Vasilyevich Torkunov (ed.), Sovremennyye 
mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika, Prosveshchenie, Moskva 2004, p. 57.
5 Gunther Rormozer & Anatoliy Frenkin, Konservativnaya revolyutsiya, Polis, 
1-2, 1991; Tatyana Filippova, Predchuvstvie nostal’gii. O konservatizme v Rossii XIX 
veka, Svobodnaya mysl,’ 9, 1993.
6 I.e. Vladimir Baranovsky, Andrey Zagorskiy, Vladislav Inozemtsev, Vladimir 
Kulagin, Marina Lebedeva, Andrei Melville, Andrey Piontkovsky, Viktor Sergeyev, 
Dmitry Trenin, Yevgeny Fedorov, Liliya Shevtsova.  
7 Pavel Afanas’yevich Tsygankov & Andrey Pavlovich Tsygankov, Sotsiologiya 
mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, Aspekt Press, Moskva 2008.
8 The authors consider as modernizers all the die-hard pro-Westerners – 
above all Andrey Kozyrev and Yegor Gaidar – who are convinced that Russia has no 
other alternative but to integrate into the West. Institutionalists, on the other hand, 
believe that Russia needs to join international institutions instead of getting modern-
ized. Which does not prevent them from criticizing the activities of the existing glob-
al international organizations. Within this movement, Pavel and Andrey Tsygank-
ov single out two competing groups, where the first one considers the concept of 
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and institutional development. Secondly, the secondary and 
dependent nature of the Russian development path. The future 
of Russia is associated with its ability to adopt the best of the 
Western civilization in the hope of one day becoming perfectly 
integrated into it. Thirdly, the need for a pro-Western foreign 
policy inasmuch as it perfectly satisfies the Russian national 
interests.9 A good example of a coherent pro-Western approach 
is the research of Liliya Shevtsova who wonders:
Why the fact that the Western civilization is drawing closer to Russia 
is considered a threat for the Russian society, instead of a blessing and 
a security guarantee? By joining the EU institutions, the former com-
munist states managed to overcome their mutual distrust and historical 
hostility. Is it not in the best interests of Russia to have stable and suc-
cessful states? And, if so, why does Moscow see as a threat to its security 
any steps that enable these states to become stable and successful?10
The logic of the modern Westernism is countered by an alter- 
native civilization project based on the values of the Russian 
statehood and sovereignty. While the pro-Western doctrines 
feature transnational elements, the historical tradition of Rus-
sia is built on the idea of a strong State that is the only one 
capable of preventing the Eurasian space from falling apart. 
It is no wonder that its priority is placed on the idea of power 
and individual political leadership. The international processes 
of the last decade have turned the world into a pulsating vol-
cano. The Western project of reformatting the traditional 
Middle East regimes has resulted in a global humanitarian dis-
aster, the ISIS terrorists, the invasion of refugees and migrants 
in Europe. The attempts to steal the power in the post-Soviet 
space have provoked a series of bloody conflicts and civil un-
rest. Against this background, the number of supporters of in-
dependent statehood and unique system of cultural values in 
Russia has considerably increased.11 Contemporary pro-great 
power politicians – that include both conservatives and certain 
types of liberals – interpret freedom as a political indepen- 
dence, insisting on the priority of a strong state.
2. The Geopolitical level
This dimension is manifesting itself, above all, in territorial and 
spatial perceptions of ‘one’s own’ and ‘someone else’s’ worlds, 
determined by the development process of collective identity 
in the post-Soviet Russia.12 The renaissance of ‘critical geo-
politics’ in the 1990s and early 2000s was a distinct feature in 
many nations. This fashionable trend was not unexpected in 
the academic and the expert communities because it originally 
corresponded to traditional ways of thinking in the Russian po-
litical class. In 1998, the scholar Leonid Abalkin outlined the 
main features of Russian geopolitical thinking. For modelling 
the future of international relations, he identified three global 
scenarios: the first is a dominance of the U.S. ‘superpower’ 
as the world leader; the second is a dominance of the world 
‘sovereign state’ to be obsolete (Krasin, Kapustin, Lebedeva), while the second one 
believes that international organisations protect and reformulate the role of nation- 
states (Davydov). National democrats, in the opinion of the authors, are close to 
moderate institutionalists but think that “Russia should not copy somebody else’s 
models or put its trust in international institutions, but first and foremost it needs 
to find its own path to a global economic and political system, the one reflecting 
its cultural specifics.” This group advocates the interests of Russia’s multiple-vector 
diplomacy. It includes Gadzhiev, Abolin, Polyakov, Kortunov, Makarenko. See: Ibi-
dem, pp. 27-31.
9 Andrey Pavlovich Tsygankov, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya: traditsii ru- 
sskoy politicheskoy mysli, Al’fam, Moskva 2013, p. 38.
10 Liliya Fyodorovna Shevtsova, Odinokaya derzhava. Pochemu Rossiya ne sta-
la Zapadom i pochemu Rossii trudno s Zapadom, Rosspen, Moskva 2010, p. 75.
11 Andrey Pavlovich Tsygankov, Mezhdunarodnyye cit., pp. 16-38.
12 Olga Vyacheslavovna Pavlenko, Geopolitical Visions in Russia: The Post- 
Soviet Interpretations, in Bianka Pietrow-Ennker (ed.), Russland’s Imperiale Macht. 
Intergrationsstrategien und Ihre Reichweite in Transnationaler Perspektive, Böhlau 
Verlag, Köln 2012, pp. 103-123.
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elite (the so-called ‘rich world’), strictly controlling the global 
markets by means of transnational companies and by political 
lobbies of the leading economies; and the third is a multipolar 
world with six to eight regional groups in their zones of attrac-
tion and influence that could establish the interoperability and 
diversity of the civilizational areas.13 He considered the third 
scenario the best for Russia’s future. However, the develop-
ment of global processes followed such an intricate and unpre-
dictable path that in essence all three scenarios could be ob-
served. At the same time, the Russian geopolitical tradition, no 
matter which models of world development had been created, 
was characterized by a significant degree of attention to Rus-
sia’s role and place. Whatever the geopolitical models were, as 
a rule they integrated three themes: Russia’s integration in the 
world economic and political system – guided by the pattern of 
basic actor/incorporated member/outsider –; the predictable 
stability of the domestic situation and economic growth; and 
Russia’s capacity to ally with other countries and to direct its 
foreign policy strategies.
Westernism and anti-Westernism in Russian politics rep-
resented two contrasting systems of values. Nevertheless, 
they involved varying discourses that incorporated a num-
ber of concepts, images and myths. Here one might look for 
neo-Eurasianism.14 Its geosophy – a category of ‘self-develop-
ment’ – was inspiring in the 1990s among representatives of 
the different directions. Nevertheless, it did not become the 
common theoretical-methodological platform for consolidat-
ing the Russian academic expertise. Used by several groups, 
it shared the notion of the original and ‘self’-oriented nature 
of Russian civilization, interpreting Petr Savitsky’s formula that 
“Russia is neither Europe, nor Asia, but a specific geographical 
‘world’ that is called Eurasia.”15 Neo-Eurasianists did not per-
ceive geopolitics in its new interdisciplinary dimension, as it 
had started to develop in Europe and the U.S. One can identify 
certain features of the neo-Eurasianist doctrine: first, Russia is 
the synthesis of Europe and Asia, a bridge between East and 
West; second, Eurasians are a special cultural-historical type, 
a super-ethnic group and, third, Russia – by virtue of its geo- 
graphical location – represents a center that integrates the 
entire system of the continent’s periphery, i.e. Europe, Central 
Asia, Iran, India, Indochina and Japan. 
The political scientist Anastasiya Mitrofanova tends to in-
terpret the modern Eurasianism as “the most promising of the 
existing ideologies of the political Orthodoxy.” In her opin-
ion, its focus on Asia and the union with the Islamic world, 
its broad understanding of religious unity makes the Eurasian-
ism “a political religion” that allows to build “bridges” with 
China, India, the Islamic world.16 Over the last decade, it has 
turned from a fringe movement into a major alternative to 
the pro-Western geopolitical orientation. The concept of the 
‘Russian world’ as part of the Eurasian doctrine has acquired 
an official standing in the Russian national policy. Even the 
detractors of Eurasianism admit that the strategy of equidis-
tance in relation to major centers of forces enables Russia to 
make optimal choices in order to satisfy its own interests. 17
13 Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, Evolyutsionnaya ekonomika v sisteme pere-
osmysleniya bazovykh osnov obshchestvoznaniya, in Evolyutsionnaya ekonomika i 
“meynstrim”: Doklady i vystupleniya uchastnikov mezhdunarodnogo simpoziuma g. 
Pushchino, 29 maya – 1 iyunya 1998 g., Nauka, Moskva 2000, pp. 12–14.
14 The Neo-Eurasianist doctrine was formed on the basis of historic Eurasian-
ism, having been developed in the 1920s–1930s by Trubetskoy, Savitsky, Karsavin, 
and Gumilev who called himself the last proponent of Eurasianism in the mid-twen-
tieth century. Yet in a period when there was a disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
the Eurasianists received a second chance.
15 Petr Nikolaevich Savitsky, Kontinent-Evraziya, Agraf, Moskva 1997, p. 283.
16 Anastasiya Vladimirovna Mitrofanova, Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira”, 
Nauka, Moskva 2004, p. 135.
17 Kamaludin Serazhudinovich Gadzhiev, Kavkazskiy uzel v geopoliticheskikh 
prioritetakh Rossii, Logos, Moskva 2010, pp. 44-45.
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3. The political-strategic level
The political and strategic thinking of Russian elites is recorded 
in the doctrines of national and information security, military 
doctrines, foreign policy concepts, and annual President’s 
messages to the Federal Assembly. Mobilization dynamics of 
security culture is influenced by internal and external factors. 
A considerable impact is exerted by a political and strategic 
interpretation of ‘borders’ and ‘zones of influence.’ The polit-
ical review of this particular level of Russian politics notice- 
ably divides experts. This paper distinguishes several groups 
of Russian and Western specialists based on the following cri-
teria: ‘ideology,’ ‘political realism,’ ‘confrontation’ and ‘culture 
of mutual understanding.’
Russian and Western scientists give different interpreta-
tions of the notion of security. In the Russian political thought, 
the ‘security’ category is closely linked to such key concepts as 
‘national interests’ and ‘state sovereignty.’ Security is perceived 
as a case in which the state and the society are fully protected 
from both internal and external threats. As a rule, one distin-
guishes several levels of security: political, economic, military, 
environmental, information-related and the “security of the 
nation’s cultural development.”18
 The feeling of the country’s vulnerability in the face of ex-
ternal threats prompted the Russian political elite to review the 
previous guidelines of the nineties and the beginning of the 
noughties. This push for transformation of the security dis-
course came not only from the post-Soviet space – that is of 
key importance for Russia from the strategic point of view – 
but also from other parts of the world. There is a consistent 
interdependence between an increase in international insta-
bility and a heated reaction of the Kremlin when it comes to 
security issues. One may single out a sequence of international 
events that directly affected the official approach to the issues 
of military reform and the development of military-industrial 
complex as the ‘color revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space in 
2005-2006, a five-day war in the Caucasus in 2008, the coups 
d’état in Libya in 2011 and in Ukraine in February 2014. These 
crises affected the transition of the security discourse from 
the ideas of transatlantic partnership to the understanding 
of ‘threats and challenges’ caused worldwide by the ‘poorly 
designed strategy’ of the US global domination. 
Since 2008, it was developed a whole set of new strate-
gies and formulae further defining the challenges and threats 
aimed at the Russian Federation: i.e. the Foreign Policy Con-
cept of the Russian Federation of 2008 and 2013, the National 
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, the 2010 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. These documents 
recognize the existence of direct military threats to the national 
security of the Russian Federation, as well as the need to build 
up the state’s military capability and pursue a more proactive 
security policy in the post-Soviet space. 
The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation 
to 2020 (approved in 2009) is focused on the “development 
and improvement of the state’s military structure and defense 
potential.”19 The strategic targets include, firstly, “preventing 
global and regional wars and conflicts”; secondly, “realizing 
strategic deterrence in the interests of ensuring the country’s 
military security”; thirdly, the national defense is provided “on 
18 Alisher Yakubovich Babadzhanov, Voyenno-politicheskoye sotrudnichestvo 
postsovetskikh gosudarstv. Problema sochetayemosti natsional’nykh podkhodov, Aspekt 
Press, Moskva 2013, p. 101; Vladimir Mikhailovich Kulagin, Mezhdunarodnaya bezo-
pasnost,’ Aspekt Press, Moskva 2007; Sergey Vadimovich Kortunov, Natsional’naya 
i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost.’ Kontseptual’nye osnovy, GU-VSHE, Moskva 2007.
19 Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (SBRF), Strategiya natsional’noy 
bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda is online: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/
documents/99.html.
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the basis of principles of reasonable sufficiency and effective-
ness”; fourthly, the nation’s leadership planned to expand the 
“means of non-military response, mechanisms of public diplo-
macy and peacekeeping.” A separate topic in the Russian secu-
rity discourse is the correlation of the Russia’s foreign-policy 
resources and limits of their realization.20
4. Military-technical level
This context directly affects the entire body of security-related 
issues. Particular emphasis is placed, on the one hand, on the 
Soviet experience in managing military-industrial sector, as 
well as current trends and its development prospects and, on 
the other hand, on the geopolitical aspects of exportation of 
Russian arms and military equipment, as well as competition 
with American export in different world regions.21 Russian 
researchers pay great attention to the development of the mili-
tary-industrial sector. Russia now has a considerably large com-
munity of reputable military experts specializing in specific 
topics. The research works of Vorob’yev, Kosenko and Khrus-
talev are dedicated to the military reform.22 The issues of the 
army rearming and its reorganization in conformity with mod-
ern requirements were raised in the papers by Dvorkin, Bara-
banov, Pankratov, Aleksashin, Bel’yaninov.23 They compare 
the Russian and American construction practices in defense 
sector and the development strategies of armament industry. 
The analysis of regional arms markets and the study of the 
military and technical cooperation of the Russian Federation 
with various countries can be found in the analytical reviews of 
Kolpakov, Logachev, Rybas, Sukharev, and also in the encyclo-
pedic edition of the Military-Industrial Sector of Russia.24 For a 
very long time (from 1992 to 2008), the matters of military re-
form were no priority for the national policy. An armed conflict 
in South Ossetia in August 2008 got the ruling elite concerned 
about the issue of the army and armament reforming. The mili-
tary construction – that began in 2009 – is still gaining momen-
20 Nikolay Alekseyevich Kosolapov, Sila, Nasiliye, Bezopasnost’: Sovreme-
nnaya Dialektika Vzaimosvyazey, in Aleksey Bogaturov, Mark Khrustalev, Nikolay 
Kosolapov (eds.), Ocherki teorii i politicheskogo analiza mezhdunarodnykh otnoshe- 
niy, Nauchno-obrazovatel’nyy forum po mezhdunarodnym otnosheniyam, Moskva 
2002, pp. 190-195; Artem Vladimirovich Malgin, Vneshnepoliticheskie resursy i pre-
dely ikh realizatsii, Pro et Contra, 4, 2001; Olga Vladimirovna Shishkina, Vneshne- 
politicheskie resursy. Rossiya i ES na prostranstve «Obshhego sosedstva», Aspekt 
Press, Moskva 2013.
21 Aleksandr Borisovich Bezborodov & Olga Vyacheslavovna Pavlenko, Voenno- 
tekhnicheskiye aspekty natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Vestnik 
RGGU. Seriya Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. Zarubezhnoe Regionovedenie, 140 
(18), 2014, pp. 133-153.
 22 Vasiliy Vasil’yevich Vorob’yev, Finansovo-ekonomicheskoye obespecheniye 
oboronnoy bezopasnosti Rossii: problemy i puti resheniya, GUEF, Sank Petersburg 
2003; Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Burenok, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Kosenko & Gennadiy 
Aleksandrovich Lavrinov, Tekhnicheskoe osnashhenie vooruzhennykh sil RF: orga- 
nizatsionnye, ehkonomicheskie i metodologicheskie aspekty, Granitsa, Moskva 2007; 
Dmitry Igorevich Makarenko & Yevgeniy Yur’yevich Khrustalev, Kontseptual’noye 
modelirovaniye voyennoy bezopasnosti gosudarstva, Nauka, Moskva 2008.
23 Vladimir Dvorkin, Vooruzhennye sily Rossii – reformy zavershilis’?, Ezhego- 
dnik SIPRI 2006, Moskva 2007; Mikhail Barabanov, Problemy Realizatsii Gosudar- 
stvennoy Programmy Vooruzheniy na 2011-2020 gg., Eksport Vooruzheniy, 100, 2012; 
Andrey Vladimirovich Pankratov, Oboronno-promyshlennyy Kompleks: Mirovyye 
Tendentsii i Rossiyskaya Praktika, Nauka, Moskva 2006; Anatoliy Alekseyevich 
Aleksashin, Sergey Vladimirovich Garbuk & Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Gubinskiy, 
Rossiyskiy Oboronno-promyshlennyy Kompleks: Istoriya, Sovremennoye Sostoyaniye, 
Perspektivy, IMU, Moskva 2011; Andrey Yur’yevich Bel’yaninov, Integratsionnyye 
Protsessy v Oboronno-promyshlennom Komplekse Rossii, Granitsa, Moskva 2010.
24 Igor’ Dmitriyevich Sergeyev (ed.), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kompleks 
Rossii. Entsiklopediya, Voll. 1-2, Voennyi Parad, Moskva 2005; Sergey Konstanti-
novich Kolpakov & Aleksey Aleksandrovich Sukharev, Analiz i prognoz razvitiya 
rynka transportnykh samoletov, Grazhdanskaya aviatsiya. Spetsial’noe prilozhenie 
k zhurnalu “Eksport Vooruzheniy”, 90, 2011; Aleksandr Leonidovich Rybas (ed.), 
Voenno-tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo Rossii s zarubezhnymi gosudarstvami. Analiz 
rynkov, Nauka, Moskva 2008; Idem, Proryv na mirovoy rynok vooruzheniy, Rossiya 
v Global’noy Politike, 2, March 2008.
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tum. The events in Libya prompted the authorities to approve a 
full-scale State Armaments Program 2011. By 2013, the volume of 
Russian military exports increased up to 15.7 billion US dollars. 
There is another level of security culture in modern Russia 
that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this particular article, 
the media one. The evolution of online communities and the 
diffusion of information flows resulted in a significant democ-
ratization of foreign policy, which ceased to be the prerogative 
of the elite diplomacy and is gradually migrating into a pub-
lic space. Foreign-policy discourses are turning into a tool de-
signed to form collective identities. And to this effect, popular 
geopolitics deserves researchers’ particular attention.
All in all, there are several key trends in the development 
of security culture in modern Russia. Its transformations are 
similar to the movement of a pendulum that keeps on swinging 
back and forth. On one side, Russia is attracted to the West 
meanwhile, on the other, it is rejecting it. These cyclic motions 
are largely affected by foreign policy factors, and not the inter-
nal ones as it is interpreted by many Western experts. For that 
matter, the quality of expertise in the Western analytical society 
when it comes to Russia is another story. It amazes me that the 
analysts who do not speak Russian, have no knowledge of the 
traditions of the Russian political culture, its internal political 
landscape, and even no access to local information database, 
still claim to be experts when discussing the Russian politics. 
The reactions of the political class in Russia are “mirror 
like.” The more the West tries to apply deterrence and even 
confrontation strategies in regard to Russia, the harsher is the 
“response.” The escalation of threats is reciprocal. And these 
counter currents collide with each other within the framework 
of information and economic wars, the discriminatory dis-
course of the ‘other,’ the forceful political rhetoric. The capaci- 
ties for aggression on both sides are growing, yet all the while, 
there is no real threat of invasion within the circle of nuclear 
states. But the confrontational mechanisms bringing enormous 
profits to military and industrial lobbies and security agencies 
continue to function and enable politicians to successfully im-
plement mass mobilization strategies. Is it possible though that 
there are limits to acceptable confrontations in this turbulent 
situation? Could it be that we need a new interaction algorithm 
to establish a real, instead of rhetorical, dialogue?
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